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ABSTRACT 
The hypothesis which guides this thesis is that successful integration cannot be achieved 
so long as member states of a regional grouping are unwilling to subordinate the 
individual interest to the collective interest. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) – 
which is the second oldest regional institution in the Western Hemisphere – is the central 
focus of the work. In order to assess this hypothesis, the study first discusses the relevant 
integration literature, and then addresses the issue of individual vs. collective interests in 
CARICOM overall. Next it examines the specific functional area of fisheries which 
effectively illustrates the complexity of this dilemma. For nine years, member states have 
tried unsuccessfully to forge a Common Fisheries Policy and Regime to more effectively 
manage the region’s maritime resources. However, such an arrangement carries 
implications regarding perceived loss of sovereignty over portions of their Exclusive 
Economic Zones and this, inter alia, has kept member states from being able to unite on 
this issue. Boundary delimitation challenges, diverging national positions regarding the 
right of access to third party vessels and the lack of willingness to grant necessary powers 
to the implementing agency have also been shown to contribute to the lack of progress. In 
April 2011, an agreement on a common fisheries policy was finally established. 
However, given the considerably reduced reach of this agreement, the study concludes 
that CARICOM has continued to function as a regional group of independent states, in 
which maintenance of national sovereignty takes precedence over collective interest. 
Therefore, while committed in principle to deepening integration, the political leadership 
maintains a state-centric view that has compromised CARICOM’s effectiveness as a 
regional entity. 
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     CHAPTER 1: RATIONALE  
The post World War II era witnessed the occurrence of two major waves of 
regionalism. The first of these, referred to as “classic” or “old” regionalism, spanned the 
period from the end of the 1950s through the decades of the 1960s and 1970s and was 
characterized by the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and a plethora of preferential trading 
arrangements, particularly among developing countries. 
These pacts were initiated against the backdrop of the Cold War and the wave of 
decolonization which followed WWII, primarily for the purpose of fostering trade, 
developing indigenous industries, lessening economic and political dependence on 
advanced industrial countries and reducing tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions 
among signatories.  
 Post–independence leaders in the developing world found themselves in an 
international economic system characterized by unequal exchange and feared that they 
could remain trapped in a permanent state of underdevelopment as suppliers of 
inexpensive raw materials to the developed world. Consequently, it was felt that long 
term development would best be assured by adopting protectionist policies of self 
reliance. Among these for example, was the creation of intra regional regimes designed to 
artificially protect against fluctuating commodity prices and stabilize export earnings. 
Industrialization through import substitution also became a policy of choice for many 
developing countries. 
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The process of cooperation among states was viewed as a logical continuum of 
economic integration - beginning with the creation of a free trade area and moving 
through successive stages towards the point of economic union -   involving separate 
national economies forging themselves into larger economic regions.
1
 However, despite 
the proliferation of experiments with common markets and free trade agreements in the 
Middle East, Africa, the Pacific and Latin America,
2
 regional integration among 
developing countries during this period largely failed both in terms of implementation 
and in terms of the stated objective of accelerating industrialization by raising intra 
regional trade. The solidarity required of developing countries to unite behind a common 
goal proved a daunting task as many of these entities were beset by considerable conflict 
over industry allocation among member states. In addition, sheltering domestic industries 
from competition proved to be highly cumbersome and inefficient bureaucratically, as 
were the negotiation of special and differential arrangements to accommodate less 
developed members. 
The second wave of regionalism referred to as “new regionalism” emerged 
following the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the bipolar world order gave way to 
the emergence of a multi polar structure (albeit under US leadership) with new 
international divisions of power.  New regionalism was an outgrowth of the process of 
globalization and was broadly oriented toward political and social as well as economic 
development. Unlike old regionalism which was premised on the preeminence of the 
                                                          
1
 See: Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, 
1999; Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Stevens & Sons, 1950; Dennis Swann, The Economics of 
Europe: From Common Market to European Union, Penguin Books, 2000; and others. 
2
 Including inter alia the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, the Central American Common Market 
(CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) in 1960, the Central African Customs and 
Economic Union (CACEU/UDEAC) in 1964, and the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) in 1968. 
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nation state as the primary actor, new regionalism was multi dimensional in form, with a 
central premise that the role of non state actors including multinational corporations, non-
governmental organizations and other such interested social groups needed to be 
considered in the process of integration between states.  Above all, old regionalism could 
be considered a closed system where integration efforts were limited primarily to market 
interaction among the members of a particular grouping. New regionalism on the other 
hand, was essentially intended to be a more open system which would allow countries to 
form themselves into regions to compete effectively on the larger world stage. 
For developing countries in particular, the end of the Cold War brought about a 
greater sense of independence in the conduct of their foreign policies, their regional 
security affairs and in the determination of their alliances. However, with this 
independence, came a sense of increased vulnerability. By the 1980s, trade liberalization 
and the increased interconnectedness of the world’s economies were transforming the 
global landscape. Developing countries of all sizes began to face greater competition in 
their international markets. Although in principle these new linkages were supposed to 
provide greater access to larger markets and increased opportunities for businesses, the 
reality was that these benefits were not equitably distributed with developed economies 
clearly having the advantage. Therefore, the fashioning of more effective regional 
organizations was seen as a rational policy choice, particularly by small states, for 
strengthening their links with the industrialized world, making their collective voices 
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heard on the global stage and as a way of combating dangerous isolation and permanent 
relegation to the “periphery of world politics.”3 
However, whether old or new, the strategy of regional integration requires 
relinquishing, to some degree, individual sovereignty, as well as subordinating the 
national, individual interest to the regional, collective interest. For this reason, successes 
in regional integration have been few and far between and have been incremental and 
disjointed at best. Even the European Union, which stands today as the most successful 
example of regional governance in an interrelated system, has not been without its 
problems in this regard.   
In this thesis, I have chosen to focus on the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 
This community is the second oldest regional institution in the Western Hemisphere; 
hence its progress should be of interest to anyone engaged in the study of integration 
particularly in the global south and among small developing states. In fact, if there is any 
region in the world that should benefit from forming itself into a regional entity, the 
Caribbean is that region as the individual nations cannot survive economically as 
scattered entities of disparate size. 
 I will be assessing the extent to which integration has been hindered by the 
inability of member states of CARICOM to subordinate the individual to the collective 
interest. My study aims to contribute to the understanding of the dilemmas faced by the 
Caribbean nations as they struggle to reconcile the desire to retain control over national 
                                                          
3
 John Chipman, “Third World Politics and Security in the 1990s:The World Forgetting, By the World 
Forgot?,” The Washington Quarterly, 14:1 (Winter 1991): 151; Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: 
An Introduction, London, Routledge, 1985, pp: 3-5 
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sovereignty on the one hand and the overarching requirements of regionalism on the 
other. 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an integrated body comprising fifteen 
(15) sovereign member states. Thirteen of these are English – speaking; one is Dutch – 
speaking and one, French – speaking.4 In addition, the community comprises five 
associate members which are dependent territories of the United Kingdom.
5
 The region’s 
population is approximately 14 million
6
 and its geographical boundaries extend from the 
Bahama Islands in the North southwards to Guyana and Suriname and from Belize in the 
West to the mainland of Barbados which is the most easterly of the Caribbean islands. 
CARICOM was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas on 4 July 1973 and 
became the first example in the developing world of a free trade area moving towards a 
customs union.
7
 Its primary objectives were three fold: to create a single economic 
market as the centerpiece of its regional integration effort; to strengthen the region’s 
external position via the coordination of its member states’ foreign policies; and to pool 
scarce resources through functional cooperation in areas such as health, education, 
environment, communications and science and technology. 
Its establishment coincided with a world economic crisis which had a severely 
damaging impact on the economies of the Caribbean. Uncertain prices for the few 
primary products being exported, declines in foreign exchange earnings from tourism, 
                                                          
4
 The member states of CARICOM are Antigua & Barbuda, the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. 
5
 Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. 
6
 Caricom Secretariat, CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community, Kingston, Jamaica. Ian Randle Publishers, 
2005, P: 4 
7
 W. Andrew Axline, “Integration and Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Politics of 
Regional Negotiations,” International Organization, 32:4 (Autumn 1978): 953. 
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rising oil prices, higher energy costs and even devastation wreaked by natural disasters all 
combined to adversely affect the region.
8
 By the middle of the 1980s, loss of revenue and 
declining terms of preferential trade propelled several CARICOM member states to enter 
into Structural Adjustment Programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. The austerity measures began crippling their already unstable and fragile 
economies. The excesses of this period discouraged deeper integration as Caribbean 
leaders remained preoccupied with issues of national rather than regional concern. 
 In the 1990s, the onset of globalization and the intensification of unfettered free-
market capitalism worldwide combined to adversely affect the individual economies of 
the Caribbean and to threaten their ability to compete due to their small size. In addition, 
other non –traditional threats such as the growing illicit drug trade with its attendant rise 
in crime as well as the spread of the HIV-Aids pandemic, all continued to affect the 
region’s economies.  By the end of the 20th century CARICOM found itself on the 
threshold of a new century unprepared for the new dispensation. There was a distinct gap 
between the regional arrangements that existed at the time and the demands of the new 
era. Consequently, given their limited financial and human resources, Caribbean leaders 
were obligated to turn their attention more urgently towards enhancing regional 
cooperation and in particular, to take a more critical look at the concept of integration and 
the institutional arrangements upon which it was supported. 
 One of the landmark decisions taken in 1989 in order to better respond to the 
challenges and opportunities presented by globalization was to establish a Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy (CSME). This proposal envisaged the transformation of the 
                                                          
8
 The World Bank, Annual Report (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1981), pp: 64-65 
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Caribbean into a single economic space comprising the national markets and economies 
of the Community. The CSME was to allow free movement of goods and services, capital 
and labor and a common currency was to be introduced. It is significant to note that the 
CSME was agreed to in principle twelve years before it was actually signed into life 
(2001) and that an additional five years elapsed before the Single Market became 
functional.
9
  To date (2012), the Single Economy has not yet been implemented.  
 The region’s leaders continue to employ what has been described as a 
“discretionary mode of intergovernmental cooperation”10 in which they believe that it is 
possible to deepen regional integration via structures such as the CSME while 
maintaining maximum individual sovereignty. Failure to effectively resolve this dilemma 
has no doubt hindered full implementation of the CSME and has prevented CARICOM 
from achieving the anticipated level of success as a regional body. 
Thus, in spite of thirty eight years of existence, CARICOM has not achieved the 
level of success envisaged by its founders. This is largely because the nations of the 
Caribbean remain at heart an amalgam of independent sovereign states first and an 
integrated community second. They perceive themselves to be a group of states in which 
“sovereignty is pooled but never ceded”11 and in which the nation-state is the locus of 
decision-making in terms of the implementation of regional decisions. The esteem in 
                                                          
9
 Matthew l. Bishop and Anthony Payne, “Caribbean Regional Governance and the Sovereignty/Statehood 
Problem,” Ontario, Canada: Center for International Governance.(CIGI)The Caribbean Papers, Paper No.8, 
February 2010, p: 8. Online available at www.cigionline.org (accessed November 2, 2011). 
10
 Havelock R. Brewster 2003. The Caribbean Single Market and Economy: Is it Realistic Without 
Commitment to Political Unity? Online available at 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/csme_politicalunity_brewster.jsp (accessed December 9, 2011). 
11
 Karen E. Bravo, “Caricom: The Myth of Sovereignty and Aspirational Economic Integration,” North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 31:1(2005): 166 
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which Caribbean leaders hold their individual sovereignty cannot be underestimated 
either - a reality conditioned both by the prevailing political culture as well as the 
region’s past experience of statehood. Therefore, while they are ostensibly committed to 
the process of deeper integration, the inability to relinquish that state-centric view has 
kept the institutions of CARICOM fragmented and has reduced its effectiveness as a 
regional entity. 
In the next chapter, I will outline my research design and relevant theoretical 
literature, to be followed by substantive chapters dealing with the dynamics of integration 
in the Caribbean Community. 
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           CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN/ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Research Design 
My hypothesis is: 
Successful integration cannot be achieved so long as Member States of a 
regional grouping are unwilling to subordinate the individual interest to the 
collective interest. I have formulated this hypothesis based on the assumption that 
regionalism requires the relinquishment of sovereign powers and prerogatives and as long 
as self interest is maintained, progress will be incremental at best.   
In order to assess my hypothesis, I have chosen the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) as my case study. As noted in the previous chapter, this is a regionally 
integrated body comprising member states of the Caribbean.  By virtue of the fact that it 
has been in existence for the past thirty eight years, this entity should be of interest to any 
scholar interested in the challenges of integration and regional governance, particularly 
among small developing countries.  First, I will address the issue of individual vs. 
collective interests in CARICOM as a whole. Secondly, I propose to focus on one 
specific functional area – fisheries - which I believe effectively illustrates the complexity 
of the dilemma faced by the organization’s member states in reconciling the competing 
interests of national sovereignty and regionalism.  
CARICOM’s members are all coastal states united by a sea with vast resource 
potential. The fisheries sector of the region plays a significant role in the overall 
economic development and the cultural identity of the individual states. It is important to 
10 
 
the region’s food security and to poverty alleviation, particularly among rural 
communities in the less developed islands. For many, the sector serves as a valuable 
income generator and foreign currency earner. Due to the close proximity of these islands 
to each other as well as developments in international law which have allowed for the 
creation of common continental shelf areas between islands, many of the more abundant 
resources in the region are classified as “straddling stocks.” This clearly underscores the 
need for cooperation in management of the region’s fisheries resources. While the 
governments of CARICOM recognize the need to forge a common fisheries policy to 
govern the exploitation of the region’s fish stocks, this new arrangement also has 
implications regarding the perceived loss of sovereignty by members over the full extent 
of their Exclusive Economic Zones. 
Relevant Theoretical Literature 
In order to fully understand whether this dilemma between regionalism and 
national sovereignty can be reconciled, it would first be useful to consider what some of 
the major international relations theorists have to say on the subject of regional 
integration and the possibility and reasons for cooperation between states. 
Neorealism 
The neorealist theoretical perspective characterizes the world as an anarchic 
system in which each state is a rational, unitary actor concerned primarily with its own 
security, power and survival. This preoccupation predisposes states toward conflict and 
11 
 
competition to the extent that despite common interests, they may sometimes fail to 
cooperate.
1
 
Anarchy, according to the neorealist definition, denotes the absence of a common 
interstate government and it is this interpretation which conditions the realist’s 
understanding of whether interstate cooperation will result or not. The absence of an 
overarching authority means that there is no overriding entity to prevent one state from 
acting in a manner which is inimical to the interests of another. Therefore, anarchy causes 
all states to be motivated to a certain degree by fear and mistrust.
2
 The anarchic system 
shapes state preferences and conditions the nature of the interaction that occurs between 
states. 
A rational state will only integrate with others or join a cooperative system if 
doing so favors its own national interest or allows it to derive some direct benefit from 
the arrangement. However, joining such an alliance does not in any way imply 
renunciation of individual sovereignty or decision making power. For the realist, the 
national government remains the most important actor in the international system and its 
interaction with other states will be determined entirely by the furtherance of its own 
interests. From the realist’s perspective, transnational actors, corporations and institutions 
are politically irrelevant. 
Kenneth Waltz suggests that every state’s first concern is to maintain its position 
in the system.
3
 This “state positionality” may constrain a state’s willingness to commit to 
                                                          
1
 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organization, 42:3 ( Summer 1998): 488. 
2
 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp: 304-305 
3
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979, p: 126 
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any type of cooperative arrangement since it may believe that in doing so, its adversary 
may also be achieving relative gains through the same arrangement. A state may 
therefore be willing to forego cooperation, even if it may result in absolute gains, if the 
possibility exists that such cooperation may also redound to the benefit of another thereby 
causing a more powerful adversary to emerge.
4
 Waltz advocates further that a state may 
be disinclined to enter into a cooperative agreement with another since such an 
arrangement may create excessive dependence thereby rendering that state vulnerable and 
reducing its autonomy. This is often referred to as “vulnerability dependence” and is used 
to describe a relationship of subordination in which one state is supported by another or 
must depend upon another for the fulfillment of a particular need.
5
 
John Mearsheimer
6
 challenges the liberalist contention that institutions can alter 
states’ behavior and encourage cooperation by steering them away from strategically 
calculating their every move in terms of how their relative power positions are affected. 
He claims that institutions define and prescribe the terms and conditions under which 
states either choose to cooperate or compete with each other and that these rules are 
negotiated and agreed upon by the states themselves. His contention therefore is that it is 
up to individual states to adhere to the rules that they themselves have created and as 
such, since institutions have no mechanism of command, they cannot independently 
affect state behavior. Mearsheimer states that institutions are tools that states’ utilize for 
their own selfish purposes and they reflect states’ calculations of self-interest based on 
concerns regarding relative gain.  
                                                          
4
 Grieco, p: 499 
5
 Waltz, p: 106 
6
 John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19:3 (Winter 
1994/1995): 5-49. 
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Liberalism 
Liberalists, like realists also consider states to be rational and dominant actors in 
the international system. However, unlike realists who see the state as a unitary actor, 
liberalists perceive that societies are connected to each other through various channels. 
Transgovernmental organizations such as multinational firms and banks for example, as 
well as international organizations all have the ability to make individual government 
policies in various countries more sensitive to each other. By their very structure, the 
actions of these organizations transcend national boundaries and allow the domestic 
policies of one country to impinge on that of another. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
refer to this as “complex interdependence.”7 
Secondly, instead of an inherently anarchic system which automatically guides 
behavior, liberalists posit that the agenda of interstate relationships is not arranged 
according to any specific hierarchy of issues but rather that it changes based upon the 
way in which issues are prioritized. States may have conflicting and complementary 
agendas, but they nonetheless interact and establish cooperation based on the areas of 
overlapping interest. Further, since increased economic interconnectedness presents a 
variety of opportunities and incentives for interstate cooperation, states have become 
more dependent upon each other for the attainment of their own individual national goals 
thereby blurring the line between domestic and foreign policy. According to the liberalist 
                                                          
7
 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence,  Little, Brown and Company, 1977 
pp: 33-35, 226-229 
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rationale, states may view each other not necessarily as adversaries but as essential 
partners “needed to secure greater comfort and security for their home publics.”8 
Liberal theorists argue that cooperation between nations is not the absence of 
conflict but rather is a condition that emerges in an effort to overcome conflict. They 
accept that few states would voluntarily give up their rights to self help but claim that in 
an increasingly interdependent global society, states may be more willing to adjust their 
positions if they are convinced that in doing so their actions would redound to the benefit 
of all those with similar interests. According to Robert Keohane: “Cooperation requires 
that the actions of separate individuals or organizations which are not in preexistent 
harmony be brought into conformity with one another through a process of 
negotiation…Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others.”9 
 Liberalists see international institutions and organizations as entities with the 
expertise necessary to mediate conflict among states, foster bases of cooperation, 
establish codes of conduct or guidelines under which all can benefit and promote a more 
inclusive foreign policy agenda. They concede that cooperation in an anarchical system is 
possible even in the absence of a hegemonic power as long as a commonality of self 
interests exist. They argue that regimes can assist in mitigating the levels of fear and 
uncertainty that characterize state behavior under the anarchic system and can also help 
in the reduction of collective action problems. However, liberalists state that the fact that 
                                                          
8
 Greico, p: 490 
9
 Robert O. Keohane,  After Hegemony,  Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1984, p: 34 
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countries cooperate, form and participate in these international and regional organizations 
does not make conflict and cooperation mutually exclusive. 
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration developed most extensively 
by Ernest Haas in 1958
10
 to explain the process of European integration and in particular, 
to explain the circumstances under which countries would voluntarily merge with their 
neighbors, thereby risking the loss of certain attributes of individual sovereignty. It 
assumed a decline in the importance of nationalism and the nation state and viewed 
integration as an automatic process. 
The logic behind this theory is that states’ activities are the outcome of a 
pluralistic political process in which the decisions taken by individual governments are 
influenced by pressure emanating from bureaucratic actors and interest groups alike. 
Further, neo functionalists argue that the activities of these actors are not confined solely 
to the domestic political environment. Therefore, in order to satisfy their own interests, 
actors could find themselves forging linkages and developing contacts with their 
counterparts in other states. 
According to Hass, the economies of modern states are interconnected and as 
such, it is practically impossible to isolate one sector from another. Once countries agree 
to harmonize and coordinate their economic policies for example, the complexity of this 
coordination and the interconnectedness between their respective economic sectors will 
out of necessity, automatically “spillover” into the political sphere of integration and will 
                                                          
10
 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, London, Library 
of World Affairs, 1958 
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ultimately lead to the creation of supranational institutions. Haas refers to this as the 
“expansive logic of sector integration.”11 A central premise of the neo functionalist 
prediction was that integration would, by virtue of this concept of “spillover,” be self-
sustaining. 
Haas claims that as the process of integration gathers momentum, certain interest 
groups, associations and lobby groups will systematically transfer their allegiances away 
from the nation state to these newly formed regional organizations or new power centers, 
perceiving them to be better conduits through which to pursue their material interests 
rather than through the national institutions existing in each individual nation state. As 
integration advances, the neo functionalist argument is that these supranational 
organizations would take on a life of their own, by taking the lead in sponsoring further 
integration and becoming more autonomous and powerful than the individual nation 
states themselves. For Haas, the driving force behind political integration was the 
calculated self-interest of the political elites who would be willing to defer to 
supranational arrangements when it seemed suitable to their interests.
12
 
Haas viewed integration as a process leading to a specific end product. Leon 
Lindberg on the other hand, another neo functionalist coming after Haas, while also 
viewing it at a process, sought to offer a more cautious definition of integration without 
specific reference to an end point.
13
 Central to Lindberg’s definition was the idea that the 
                                                          
11
 Ibid, p: 311 
12
 Ben Rosamund, Theories of European Integration,  Hampshire, Palgrave McMillan, 2000, p: 9 
13
 Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford, CA., Stanford 
University Press, 1963, p: 6 
17 
 
mechanism by which collective decisions are arrived at is integral to all regional 
integration efforts.  
In 1970, Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold further reformulated this theory. They 
posited that Haas’ view of integration as automatic and self sustaining was too narrow 
and instead they introduced the idea that integration was a process in which domestic 
groups may lobby their individual governments based upon their own needs and 
expectations, and that regional institutions could play an invaluable role in building 
coalitions to overcome national resistance to new policies and decisions.
14
 Lindberg and 
Scheingold opined that while Haas’ version of neo functionalism described a domestic 
process, it offered no explanation either for the basic causes of variation in national 
demands for integration or for the methods by which individual governments prioritize 
competing alternatives and eventually establish preferences.
15
 
Some critics of neofunctionalist theory have claimed that “gradual politicization” 
and inevitable “spillover” have not taken place outside of Europe and further, that the 
theory itself could not be effectively applied to regional integration efforts in the 
developing world since the domestic politics of developing nations do not provide fertile 
ground for this type of process.
16
 
                                                          
14
 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart  A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the 
European Community , Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970. 
15
 Ibid, p: 284 
16
 For example Roger Hansen, Stanley Hoffman, Walter Mattli 
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One of the major challengers to this theory is Stanley Hoffman,
17
 who offers a 
counter-argument to the neo functionalist’s ideas. He argues primarily that economic 
integration does not necessarily lead to political integration since economics and politics 
are independent of each other. To illustrate this, he makes a distinction between high and 
low politics. The latter refers to technocratic issues and matters of secondary importance 
such as social or regional policy, while the former refers to more fundamental policy 
areas such as defense, foreign affairs and fiscal policy. Hoffman’s contention is that 
where national interests coincide, governments may be willing to accept closer 
integration in the areas of functional cooperation, but in the areas of high politics, the 
nation state would not accept any transfer of sovereignty in favor of a supra national 
authority.
18
 
Although he acknowledges that interest groups can influence the decisions of 
governments, his argument is that national governments are really the ultimate arbiters of 
key decisions. They possess legal sovereignty and secondly, political legitimacy since 
they are the democratically elected actors. Further, Hoffman states that political 
calculations often lead governments to adopt positions to which powerful interest groups 
may even be hostile. These calculations however, are mainly driven by individual 
domestic concerns and concerns about the impact of decisions for the governing party of 
the day. Therefore, any relinquishment of sovereignty and ceding of power to a 
supranational organization will only take place if the government perceives it to be in its 
                                                          
17
 See: Stanley Hoffman, “The European Process at Atlantic Cross-purposes,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 3:2 (1965): 85-101; Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and 
the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, 95:2 (Summer  1966): 862-915. 
18
 Hoffman, 1964, p: 89  
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own interest. Integration therefore is intergovernmental and would go only as far as the 
government would allow.
19
 
Hoffman’s work was the genesis of what later became known in the IR field as 
the theory of inter governmentalism which I will use as the theoretical framework to 
explain and analyze some of the difficulties being encountered by the CARICOM 
member states as they seek to formulate a Common Fisheries Policy and Regime  in the 
region. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
  The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) was first developed by Andrew 
Moravcsik in 1993.
20
 In the same vein as Hoffman, Moravcsik argues that states are 
rational actors, in that their actions are directed towards the achievement of a set of 
consistently ordered objectives. Departing from realist theory which claims that states 
have fixed preferences, for example for wealth, power or security, LI borrows from 
Robert Putnam asserting that domestic political processes determine national interest and 
that a government’s position in the international arena is formulated strictly on the basis 
of goals which are defined domestically.
21
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This model of rational state behavior based on domestic preferences implies that 
governments must first define and formulate their national interests and secondly, bargain 
among themselves in order to realize those objectives. Moravcsik combines the process 
of national preference formation with bargaining theory to explain a third feature -
institutional choice, which he defines as the circumstances under which actors will either 
decide to pool or delegate decision making to a higher, overarching international 
institution.
22
 
LI theorists claim that the primary interest of any government is to retain office 
which requires that it seek to enlist the support of various coalitions, parties and interest 
groups in civil society. The views of these entities are usually transmitted to the political 
directorate through domestic institutions and it is through this process that national 
interests are formulated and brought to the table during international negotiations. 
In referring to cooperation within the European Union, Moravcsik concludes that 
the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are the primary determining factors 
of national preferences rather than the political biases of politicians or national strategic 
concerns.
23
 States are more inclined to cooperate when such collaboration allows them 
greater leverage over their own domestic policy outcomes than would otherwise have 
been possible. Moravcsik explains that “negative externalities,”24 occur when the policies 
of one state impose costs on or negatively impact the nationals of another, thereby 
undermining the goals of the latter’s  policies and he contends that the possibility of 
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improving these negative externalities through policy coordination generates an incentive 
for integration. Conversely, where a state can unilaterally adopt measures to effectively 
counteract another’s policies, there is little incentive or need for cooperation. 
It is also possible for agreements to appear to be mutually beneficial but for 
governments to have very different perceptions regarding the costs, benefits and level of 
domestic risk associated with pursuing one particular policy over another. Moravcsik 
claims that there is a direct correlation between the intensity of the societal pressure 
applied to national governments and the amount of flexibility which one state may have 
in its ability to cooperate with another. He argues that ideally, a precondition for 
international agreement is a convergence of the interests of the dominant groups in the 
negotiating states.
25
  
Based upon domestically formulated national preferences, every state has a 
specific amount of leverage or window of bargaining space through which it can produce 
viable agreements with another, each of which has the potential to generate gains. If 
states are to pursue a common policy, they must collectively select the best or most 
mutually beneficial from the agreement choices available to them. LI theory posits that 
the challenge for governments according to this logic is to decide how best to collectively 
ensure that any mutual gains to be derived from a specific agreement can be equitably 
distributed in spite of their conflicting interests. 
Moravcsik argues that the outcome of negotiation among states is directly linked 
to their relative bargaining power which is derived from what he refers to as “patterns of 
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asymmetrical interdependence”26 – the unequal distribution of the benefits of a particular 
agreement for each negotiating party.  In order for cooperation to occur, all parties must 
be convinced that the benefits to be derived from such cooperation are preferable to the 
best alternative available to them individually. LI theory claims that the ability of a state 
to reject cooperation or to threaten non-agreement provides it with a fundamental source 
of bargaining power. In general, those which are liable to gain significantly from a 
popular agreement will be more willing to compromise and collaborate jointly to achieve 
those gains. Conversely, those actors that perceive their available policy alternatives as 
more attractive tend to be more manipulative of the bargaining process and more inclined 
to threaten the others with non cooperation or to impose conditions.
27
 
The third stage of LI as outlined by Moravcsik is institutional choice which he 
uses to explain the circumstances under which member states may agree to transfer 
national sovereignty in decision making. Transference of sovereignty according to LI 
theory means either (a) utilizing a system of qualified majority voting as opposed to 
unanimous voting – pooling of sovereignty or (b) delegating sovereign decision making 
powers to a semi-autonomous institution. 
Moravcsik contends that the degree of political risk that a state is willing to take 
impacts directly on the type of decision making structure that member states choose.
28
 
Governments that are averse to risk in general, will only agree to relinquish their own 
individual decision making power if they have calculated that the scope and magnitude of 
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any possible loss can be minimized. The incentive to delegate authority is only evident in 
cases where there is very little probability that the effects of delegated or pooled 
decisions can impact negatively on the national government itself or on any of its 
particularly influential domestic constituents. 
Constructivism 
Constructivist theory draws our attention to the role that ideas play in shaping 
actors’ identities, interests and ultimately, decisions. These ideas are more than simply 
the beliefs of individuals. They are shared among peoples (intersubjective) and expressed 
as practices and identities (institutionalized).
29
 Jeffrey Legro states that ideas are both 
symbolic and organizational- they are “embedded not only in human brains but also in 
the collective memories, government procedures, educational systems and rhetoric of 
statecraft.”30 Ideas take precedence over material factors and influence the self image, 
interests and preferences of a state as well as the way it perceives the world and others. 
Over a continuous period of time and through back and forth interaction, states 
develop certain understandings and expectations of others’ behavior and it is based on 
these meanings which they attach to each other that cooperation and interaction either 
develop or not. Constructivists argue that each state develops its identity essentially 
through the perceptions of others and through the process of reciprocal interaction 
itself.
31
 The common ideas and the knowledge that states hold subjectively about 
themselves and others provide them with their identities and establish the norms of 
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behavior which will determine whether their interaction becomes adversarial or 
cooperative. Constructivists do not believe that states have a portfolio of interests which 
exist external to the particular situation in which they find themselves.
32
 Only when 
confronted by a specific situation, will a state act in a manner warranted by that situation 
and by such action, its interests will be defined.  
Identities may either change or be sustained through the actions of an “alter” and 
“ego” actively involved in a relational process.33 If for example, one state is perceived as 
a threat to another, it will continue to be thought of as such until it takes significant steps 
to prove otherwise. If each believes that the other is likely to seek its destruction, then 
they will both continue to act with hostility and will confirm the beliefs which they had 
developed and internalized about each other up to that point. The constructivists 
acknowledge the self help contention of realist theorists but they are careful to point out 
that this condition emerges as a result of two states acting in ways that lead one to feel 
threatened, thereby creating an expectation that the other is not to be trusted. Even if not 
intentional, egoists can learn to cooperate by redefining and reshaping their interests and 
identities according to new understandings and shared commitments. 
They add that evolutionary processes sometimes force actors to redefine 
themselves and to change their behavior over time. This transformation of identity can 
lead therefore to a change in previous relations between actors and can open the way for 
collaboration. However, this evolutionary process by which consensus is eventually 
broken down to facilitate cooperation can sometimes prove to be very slow. 
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In terms of integration, constructivists claim that shared identity among states 
gives rise to a sense of community belonging or transnational solidarity. The more 
entrenched that “we-feeling” becomes, the greater would be the inclination for states to 
enter into cooperative agreements with each other. Successful regional cohesion depends 
upon that sustained sense of community based on mutual responsiveness, trust and 
“cognitive interdependence.” 34 Given the constructivists’ claim that sameness fosters 
common interests, when applied to CARICOM, one would logically have thought that by 
now, its member states would have been able to achieve much greater success in regional 
integration. 
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          CHAPTER 3:THE PHASES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
Historical Background 
The West Indies Federation,
1
 established in 1958, marked the first real attempt in 
modern history to arrive at a comprehensive regional governance structure in the 
Caribbean. Britain was in the process of rebuilding its economy following the end of 
World War II and was amenable to the possibility that some of its Caribbean territories 
may have been “viable” enough to sustain self-government as a single sovereign unit 
since the cost of maintaining its colonies was proving burdensome at that time. 
Shortly after its establishment, a number of federal institutions and supporting 
structures were quickly put in place to strengthen the union. A federal civil service was 
created, cooperation in tertiary education was consolidated,
2
 a West Indies shipping 
service was established and discussions got rapidly underway regarding the issues of 
taxation, the creation of a Regional Customs Union and reformation of the Federal 
constitution. 
However, the federation was beset by several problems. There were 
disagreements among the territories regarding the governance and administrative 
structures imposed on them by Britain; contention regarding the imposition of taxes and 
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centralized planning; reticence to concede power to the federal government and even 
discord regarding the location of the federal capital.  
In 1961, following a national referendum to determine its continued participation 
in the regional group, Jamaica withdrew from the federation. Instead, it opted to pursue 
independence from Britain as a separate state. This decisive development marked the 
beginning of the demise of the West Indies Federation. Trinidad and Tobago withdrew 
shortly thereafter and by 1962 - just four short years after its inception- the federation 
collapsed.  
The establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) marked 
the next important phase in regional integration in the Caribbean. Once the federation had 
folded, Caribbean leaders were hesitant to immediately revisit the idea of integration. 
However, it was evident that there was a need for greater cooperation in the region, 
particularly in economic matters. CARIFTA, which was established in May 1968,
3
 
became the first manifestation of a loose type of cooperative framework. 
Its primary function was to increase, liberalize and diversify intra-regional trade 
among member states. Its remit also included creating the necessary regional structures 
that would facilitate deeper integration and initiating negotiations with a view to 
establishing a regional financial institution
4
 which would finance specific projects in key 
sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, education, and tourism. 
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Although the primary purpose for creating CARIFTA was to deepen integration 
in the region, there were those who, for their own reasons, were equally interested in 
widening the organization to allow membership by other countries that were not part of 
the English speaking Caribbean. This attempt to dilute the intimacy of the organization, 
threatened to stunt CARIFTA’s progress early by making it difficult to achieve consensus 
on movement towards a unified economic community. 
Another development at this time which had a considerable impact on the member 
states of CARIFTA was the successful bid made by the United Kingdom to enter the 
European Economic Community (EEC). This decision by Britain raised many questions 
regarding the special system of Commonwealth trade preferences which had previously 
existed between Britain and other Commonwealth nations. The rules of the EEC 
however, did not allow a member state to either give to or receive from non-member 
countries better trade conditions than were given to or received by member states of the 
Community. It meant therefore that CARIFTA countries would either have had to extend 
trade preferences to all members of the EEC or discontinue their arrangements with 
Britain. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, CARIFTA did achieve a measure of success 
with respect to satisfying its mandate to increase intra-regional trade.
5
 During this period, 
significant developments were also beginning to take place in non economic areas such 
as education, legal affairs, broadcasting, health and tourism. Collaboration in these areas 
led to the formation of regional institutions such as the Caribbean Broadcasting Union 
(CBU), the Council of Legal Education (CLE) and the Caribbean Examinations Council 
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(CXC) – a tangible sign that there was need to strengthen integration beyond trade and 
economic issues. 
On July 4, 1973 the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed to establish the Caribbean 
Community and the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM). These were devised as 
separate legal and institutional entities for the purpose of providing flexibility to 
accommodate national preferences for regional integration.
6
 The former comprised the 
functional relationships and institutions designed to integrate the region politically and 
economically, while the latter was intended to strengthen economic and trade relations 
among member states. CARICOM’s policy agenda was threefold – to deepen integration 
through a common market and common trade policies; to extend functional cooperation 
by pooling resources and sharing services particularly in the areas of human and social 
development; and to present a united front in its external relations through  foreign policy 
coordination. 
Although CARICOM achieved considerable success in the areas of functional 
cooperation (notably in health and education)
7
 and, to a lesser degree, in the coordination 
of foreign policy,
8
 as a trade related development strategy, the common market, up until 
the end of the 1980’s had not produced the anticipated level of intraregional integration.9 
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It has been suggested that structural factors such as the similarity of the islands’ 
economies and their highly concentrated export base were in part responsible for the 
inhibited growth of intraregional trade.
10
 With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago,
11
 
the region’s economies had remained tied to Europe through the post colonial period via 
a variety of unilateral trade preference agreements. While these arrangements provided a 
guaranteed and protected market, particularly to the less developed countries, they proved 
to be a poor foundation for diversifying economic activity.   
In addition, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the 
European Union, the pendulum of world economic thought began to swing in favor of 
free markets, less State intervention and intensified trade liberalization. The vulnerability 
and dependence of these small island states became evident as loss of revenue and 
inability to compete given the new global landscape created a desperate need to borrow. 
As structural adjustment measures applied by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank became more entrenched, CARICOM’s fragile economies began to falter. In 
light of these factors, it became clear that CARICOM needed to re-constitute and 
reorganize itself yet again if it were to adequately serve as an agent for Caribbean 
development through integration.
12
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Imperatives: Regional Governance and Integrated Development, eds. Kenneth Hall and Dennis Benn, 
Kingston: Ian Randle, 2005 p: 136; Pollard, p: 887 
10
 J.F. Hornbeck, CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic Integration, CRS Report 
RL 34308, January 2008, p: 11 
11
 Trinidad & Tobago’s economy was dominated by the exportation of oil which was not affected by 
preferential trade pacts. It continued to be the dominant exporting country in intra- regional trade 
between 1981-2001 accounting for approximately 56.7 percent of total intra-regional exports. See 
Caricom Secretariat 2005, p: 115 
12
 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, “Repositioning the Caribbean within Globalization,” Ontario, Canada: 
Center for International Governance and Integration. (CIGI) The Caribbean Papers, Paper No. 1, 2007 p: 2 
Online available at www.cigionline.org (accessed July 12, 2011). 
31 
 
The signing of the Grand Anse declaration in 1989
13
 was a watershed event in the 
history of CARICOM integration. Among the key initiatives agreed upon to chart this 
new course for the region were the establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy (CSME); free movement of CARICOM nationals; free movement of skilled 
and professional personnel; establishment, for the first time, of an Assembly of Caribbean 
Community Parliamentarians (ACP); and the formation of an independent West India 
Commission (WIC) to advance the goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
In 1992, after two years of deliberations, the WIC published a report on 
CARICOM entitled “Time for Action” in which it highlighted a number of the 
institution’s deficiencies. First was its failure to provide an effective mechanism for 
ensuring that decisions taken at the regional level could be implemented at the national 
level.
14
 The lack of common institutions was also cited as a critical weakness of 
CARICOM. Thirdly, the WIC found that CARICOM suffered from “implementation 
paralysis” which it viewed as “a chronic CARICOM deficiency”.15 
Reformation of the governance structure of CARICOM as called for by the WIC 
continued to engage the attention of member states for a further nine years. On July 5, 
2001 – twelve years after it had been agreed to in principle – the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas was eventually signed bringing into effect the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy (CSME). This new arrangement designated the region as a single economic 
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space and provided for the free movement of goods, labor and capital among member 
states for the purpose of improving productivity and ensuring the equitable allocation of 
resources among member states. However, it was not until 2006 that the Single Market 
actually became partially functional and up to the present time, the Single Economy has 
not yet been implemented.  
In the next section of this chapter, I will consider how member states’ efforts to 
reconcile their individual national interests with the collective interests of the region 
throughout the phases of regional governance described have affected the integration 
process in CARICOM. 
Individual vs. Collective Interests 
During the period immediately preceding their independence, the larger islands of 
the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, had been enjoying a 
considerable period of economic growth
16
 which allowed their leaders to believe that they 
could survive as separate states rather than be part of a Federated group. These two 
islands gained their independence in 1962 and Barbados and Guyana followed four years 
later. Once the four largest territories in the British Commonwealth had become 
independent, the smaller states of the disbanded West Indies Federation (Antigua and 
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla,
17
 Saint Lucia, St. Vincent 
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and the Grenadines) were left in “a state of bewilderment” as to how to proceed and were 
forced to seek new ways of restructuring their own political relations.
18
 
The West Indies Associated State Council of Ministers (WISA),
19
 which preceded 
what is now known as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS),
20
 was 
established in 1966 for the purpose of allowing the smaller territories to strengthen 
economic cooperation among themselves and to have a stronger bargaining position in 
the region. The WISA members established two very significant institutions - the Eastern 
Caribbean Common Market and the East Caribbean Currency Authority. The latter was 
later upgraded to become the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank in order to deepen 
integration, promote monetary stability and enhance economic planning and 
development. This period marked the beginning of a pattern of insularity and inter-island 
competitiveness which has continued to impact developmental unity among the 
Caribbean states ever since.
21
 
One of the most critical decisions taken by Caribbean leaders was to officially 
create two distinct categories of member states - the More Developed Countries (MDCs) 
and the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) - as they established CARIFTA. Their 
intention was to officially recognize that the islands were at different stages of their 
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development and that the pace of their integration should therefore be determined by the 
status they had been accorded.
22
 While it was a forward looking decision in that it 
showed recognition of the fact that the Less Developed Countries required special 
attention, it nonetheless had the effect of polarizing the region.  
 While there was progress in terms of economic cooperation under CARIFTA, 
there were still complications. First, Jamaica being the largest country was much more 
oriented to non-regional trade. As such, it strongly favored widening the membership of 
CARIFTA since its major concern was to expand its own export market. Secondly, 
Britain’s impending accession to the EEC meant that goods produced in the LDCs which 
were still under British jurisdiction would be eligible for automatic rights of entry into the 
EEC market. This was a benefit which would not have been enjoyed by the MDCs and 
further, they would not have been able to compete with a flood of European made goods 
into the region. CARIFTA was clearly not in a position to speak as a united body on the 
subject of Britain’s application to the EEC. 
 Fortunately for the integration process, the 1972 election of Michael Manley and 
the People’s National Party to office, served to bring Jamaica back into the fold since he 
was personally committed to CARIFTA and believed that integration of the region as a 
whole would redound to the benefit of its member states individually by enhancing their 
bargaining power and their international recognition.
23
 Jamaica’s change in posture 
towards the integration process helped clear the way for agreement on such measures as 
the adoption of a common external tariff, harmonization of fiscal incentives and a 
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collective approach towards foreign investment and industrial policies – all of which had 
hindered intra-regional negotiations almost from the inception of CARIFTA.
24
 
Notwithstanding these successes as well as the growth of intra-regional trade 
experienced during this period,
25
 CARIFTA proved to be somewhat limited in scope 
since trade benefits tended to favor the larger producers with the stronger manufacturing 
and industrial bases. Apart from the four MDCs, the smaller islands were monoculture 
economies producing mainly agricultural products to satisfy the comparative advantage 
of Britain. The deficiencies of CARIFTA showed that the creation of a free trade area 
was inadequate to deal with the complex problems of development and that there was a 
need for a more comprehensive approach, particularly in terms of economic integration. 
Although in principle leaders were committed to the idea of a common market 
regime for the region, the supremacy of the national sovereignties which they 
individually represented formed the basis for the discussions which preceded the 
establishment of CARICOM.
26
 In fact, the Common Market which was visualized in the 
original Treaty of Chaguaramas never really evolved beyond a loose trading regime.
27
 
One of the factors which affected integration negatively and placed a strain on relations 
between member states was the deep stratification that existed among the islands. Intra 
regional trade was largely dominated by Trinidad and Tobago because of its oil wealth 
and Barbados, with its thriving tourism industry. Jamaica, on the other hand, experienced 
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a marked decline in its exports during the early 1980s - a factor largely attributed to its 
macroeconomic instability which particularly affected its manufacturing sector.
28
    
For the period 1981 – 2001, the main markets for CARICOM exports and imports 
were the United States and the European Community. During this period, intraregional 
exports and imports amounted to approximately 14.8 percent and 9.5 percent 
respectively.
29
 CARICOM’s intra regional exports as a percentage of its total exports – 
which is itself an index of integration – for the years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000, 
amounted to 8.92, 12.99, 12.37 and 15.7 percent respectively.
30
 With volatile oil prices, 
rising interest rates and growing national debt coupled with the similarity of the region’s 
export base, what emerged during the 1980s were competitor economies vying for 
foreign investment and foreign aid which served to severely inhibit economic integration. 
The onset of globalization and the harsh realities of the global political economy which 
were confronting these fragile states in the mid to late 1980s caused leaders to focus 
inward on matters of national rather than regional concern. 
A second factor which challenged integration during the 1980s was the difficulty 
member states  faced in harmonizing their individual stances in respect of their relations 
with the super powers. The beginning of the decade of the 1980s witnessed the advent of 
a conservative Republican administration in the United States which was determined to 
re-establish U.S. global primacy and strengthen its regional hegemony. As détente was 
receding internationally, the environment in the Caribbean region began to grow more 
tense and ideologically polarized over issues such as social change, national development 
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choices, perceptions of national security, relations with Cuba and relations with the 
United States.  An ideological divide emerged as Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada 
embraced socialist doctrine while the other states opted for Western style democracy. 
Barbados for example, was openly hostile to the concept of ideological pluralism, as it 
considered this a threat to one of the cornerstones of CARICOM – to maintain a 
coordinated foreign policy.
31
 Others however, embraced political and ideological 
pluralism, cautioning CARICOM against allowing itself to become the “football of 
outside circles.”32 It was the height of the Cold War and the region served as a central 
theater for Cold War politics.  
The policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations in the Caribbean Basin were 
based primarily upon their perceptions of a series of Soviet-Cuban backed revolutions 
and regime changes in both Central America and the Caribbean which they, in turn, were 
intent upon containing. In order to achieve this, the US response was to isolate and 
destabilize the affected nations
33
 by providing increased amounts of military and 
financial support to all those in the region that agreed to defend the status quo. The US 
objective was to establish political and economic liberalism as the development model of 
choice throughout the region. It was envisaged that these goals would be achieved via 
military assistance programs, funding provided by the United States Agency for 
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 Kenneth O. Hall, Integrate or Perish: Perspectives of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean 
Community and Commonwealth Caribbean Countries 1963-2002, Kingston: Jamaica, Ian Randle 
Publishers, 2003, p: 28 
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 Ibid. Speech delivered by Linden Forbes Burnham on the occasion of the Third Annual Meeting of the 
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Ocho Rios, Jamaica, January 1982 
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 Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada. 
38 
 
International Development (USAID) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
34
 aimed to foster 
investment flows to the region’s private sector and duty-free access for nontraditional 
products to the US market. While the US was not anti-integration, its priorities did not 
include strengthening CARICOM integration institutions or furtherance of its regional 
agenda.  
The Grenadian Revolution of 1979 taken in the context of turmoil caused by 
Cuba’s adventurism and the Nicaraguan Revolution, led to a resurgence of US interest in 
the Caribbean and also adversely affected the process of Caribbean regional integration 
during the 1980s.
35
 The ideological polarization which was already being felt at the 
beginning of the decade, together with the  Grenada revolution left member states 
severely divided as regards their perceptions on national security as well their relations 
with the United States. For example, Jamaica’s quest for closer economic ties with the 
United States made it the superpower’s principal regional ally while Trinidad and Tobago 
and Guyana maintained more autonomous positions on national development and foreign 
policy. Bahamas and Belize meanwhile remained on the periphery both geographically 
and as regards regional consultations. As a result of these differing perceptions and 
priorities, it became impossible for CARICOM to develop a coordinated regional security 
mechanism or to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters. 
The organizational structure of CARICOM whereby ultimate decision making 
power was vested in the Heads of Government lent itself, from inception, to the 
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predominance of individual over collective regional interests. This was identified by the 
West Indian Commission as one of the major factors contributing to the organization’s 
lethargy, to the retardation of economic integration and to the fact that as a region, the 
Caribbean was ill equipped to face the global realities that threatened its development at 
the turn of the century. 
Among the recommendations advanced by the WIC to address these problems 
were the creation of a Caribbean Commission, a supranational body which would have 
executive authority and be “appropriately empowered to implement CARICOM’s 
decisions;”36 comprehensive revision of the Treaty of Chaguaramas to allow decisions of 
the Heads of Government and other CARICOM institutions to be incorporated into a 
body of community law; creation of a council of Ministers and the establishment of a 
Caribbean Supreme Court.  
Deliberations on these recommendations and on reformation of the structure of 
CARICOM spanned nine years. There were concerns among the Heads of Government 
that the responsibilities of the proposed Caribbean Commission could overlap with those 
of the CARICOM Secretariat (CCS) and that the latter could eventually be outflanked; 
and secondly, that the Commission could be severely hampered in the discharge of its 
mandate given the extent of political partisanship in the region.
37
  But underlying this 
uneasiness regarding the relationship between the Commission, the Member State 
governments and the CCS was the issue of the surrender of sovereignty, and it was this 
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 Cedric Grant, “An Experiment in Supranational Governance: The Caribbean Regional Negotiating 
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that served to inform the reaction of some of the incumbent Prime Ministers
38
 to the 
proposals of the WIC and ultimately led to the rejection of the idea of an independent 
Caribbean Commission.
39
  In place of the Commission, CARICOM leaders opted to set 
up a quasi-Cabinet with allocation of portfolio responsibilities among the different Heads 
together with a Bureau of Heads to facilitate implementation.  
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) which established the Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy (CSME) was eventually signed on July 5, 2001.
40
  It 
included nine supplementary protocols
41
 all of which were added to facilitate the 
establishment of the CSME. These changes were intended to allow for the creation of a 
single economic space in which the factors of labor and production would be able to 
relocate to other countries and sectors where they could be optimally employed to 
improve productivity and the efficient allocation of resources. Among the most important 
changes to the structure and governance of the Community brought into effect were the 
creation of four new Ministerial Councils
42
 and the establishment of three additional 
bodies of the Community.
43
 Articles 21 & 22 of the RTC also provide for the creation of 
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a number of institutions, suggesting for the first time, acknowledgement of the critical 
role to be played by non-state actors in the process of regional integration.
44
 However, 
despite these structural changes, the Conference of Heads still continues to retain ultimate 
control over decision making, a clear indication that the concept of integration remains 
secondary to the principle of individual sovereign equality.
45
   
Dereck O’Brien argues that while the original recommendations of the WIC were 
not completely abandoned, they were effectively sidelined by the Heads of Government 
under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and that notwithstanding minor changes to the 
voting procedures of the Community’s organs and bodies, the overall balance of power 
between the member states and the institutions of CARICOM has remained unchanged. 
These changes, he claims, were therefore little more than a superficial gesture toward a 
more supranational form of governance. O’Brien further contends that under the RTC, 
decisions of the organs of CARICOM carry no legally binding force under the municipal 
laws of individual member states unless a member state were to take steps to transpose 
these decisions into its own municipal law.
46
 In addition, member states have the 
prerogative of opting out of obligations that may arise from decisions taken by the 
Council of Ministers subject to agreement of the Heads. Therefore, it is clear that the 
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implementation gap referred to by the WIC in 1992 still remains very much a challenge 
today. 
In July of 2003, CARICOM Heads of Government adopted the Rose Hall 
Declaration,
47
 pledging to develop a system of ‘mature regionalism” whereby critical 
policy decisions of the Community would have the force of law throughout the region. 
By all accounts, this appeared to signify a resolve to strengthen the integration process 
and an appreciation of the need for legislative harmonization.  Although the leaders 
recognized in principle that they could not continue to survive in a world which had 
become less friendly towards multilateralism and inimical to the development of small 
states, and although they advocated a shift towards “mature regionalism,” in reality, they 
continued to insist on the supremacy of the member state and to refer to CARICOM as “a 
community of sovereign states,” noting that any deepening of regional integration must 
take place within that political framework.
48
  
This collective posture has attracted severe criticism from some integrationists. 
Bishop and Payne, for example, suggest that this historic attachment to national 
sovereignty in the Caribbean will continue to impede the progress of economic 
integration and will perpetuate the existing state of inertia which is gripping the region. 
They further contend that in the absence of a supranational entity specifically empowered 
to make, legislate and implement decisions, the region has been left with an overlapping 
mixture of poorly resourced institutions which has given rise to insecurity and friction 
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between the CARICOM Secretariat and the Heads of Government, particularly in the ill 
defined grey areas where institutions’ mandates intersect.49 
Havelock Brewster advances a similar argument and is quite critical of the 
assumption of the region’s leaders that it is possible to establish a single market and 
economy through a mode of discretionary intergovernmental cooperation
50
 while 
maintaining maximum sovereignty. Brewster opines that these are two diametrically 
opposed objectives and refers to the adoption of this structure as “one step forward and 
two steps backward.”51 Interestingly though, he does not suggest that 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are irreconcilable. 
He argues that unless an independent Commission is constitutionally empowered 
by the member states themselves to legislate in specific and agreed upon policy domains, 
and unless there is a legally defined demarcation between exclusive and mixed 
competence,
52
 such an entity will be nothing more than a duplication of the existing 
organs of CARICOM performing a facilitating role through “persuasion and 
brokerage.”53 These changes, however, require amendments to the laws of each 
individual Member State. 
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   Norman Girvan 
54
 argues that the failure of member states to implement at the 
national level decisions of the principal organs of CARICOM and failure to effect the 
necessary domestic legislation to make this possible are integral to the lack of success of 
the CSME and to the furtherance of regional integration generally. He admits however, 
that addressing this “implementation deficit” is a complex task which requires not only 
the political will, but the expenditure of significant political capital, the necessary legal,  
scientific and technical resources and most importantly,  the outlay of fiscal resources to 
staff and support for new institutions which will be birthed by the CSME. As small states 
with limited budgets and competing demands, there will be a tendency for each member 
to conduct its own political and economic cost benefit analysis of the measures required 
to fully implement the CSME because implementation costs are individual and 
immediate, while expected benefits accrue to the Community as a whole over a 
protracted period of time. 
With respect to the Single Economy, the principal measures outlined in the RTC 
include the establishment of an institutional framework for macro-economic policy 
formulation; monetary cooperation; harmonization of fiscal, financial and investment 
policies and capital market integration.
55
 However, as of 2012, little progress has been 
made in any of these areas. In noting the difficulties being experienced by member states, 
the 2009 CSME audit produced by the CARICOM secretariat identifies the following 
problem “the prevalence of ad hoc mandates which tend to supersede planned initiatives; 
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and generally the preference of member states for national solutions to meet challenges 
which could optimally be addressed at the regional level.”56 
This observation points directly to one of the underlying sources of the problem - 
the vast disparity in the circumstances of member states. The most evident of these are 
the differences which exist in exchange rates and exchange rate regimes, with some 
members choosing to maintain  fixed, and others floating, rates of exchange. Parities to 
the US dollar vary all the way from approximately 2 (Barbados) to 200 (Guyana), and in 
some states, exchange rates can be volatile. In addition, fiscal deficits and debt burdens 
also vary widely. Coordination of macroeconomic policies, unification of national 
currencies and exchange rates and agreement on the equitable distribution of financial 
obligations to support common policies and services have all proven thus far to be a 
daunting task. This is further complicated by the fact that the region’s member states 
have vastly different production structures. Trinidad and Tobago’s economic activity for 
example, is heavily concentrated in the oil and natural gas sectors. Jamaica and Suriname 
have large mineral sectors, while agriculture dominates the economy of Guyana. The 
economies of the OECS, the Bahamas and Barbados on the other hand, are largely 
service driven. Varying production structures also contribute to varying export structures 
which makes it difficult for member states to agree on a common development strategy 
for the region’s economic sector as a whole. Unification of the region therefore into a 
single economic space will, from all accounts, require a greater degree of restriction of 
national freedom of action than CARICOM Heads of Government are currently willing to 
endure. 
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The issue of financing the institutions of CARICOM is one which also lies at the 
heart of this distinction between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. At present, 
the Community’s only means of financing existing regional institutions comes from 
direct subventions provided by the member states themselves which are calculated based 
upon a CARICOM formula.  Regional institutions must perform well if individual 
governments are to recognize them and allocate financial resources to them. On the other 
hand, unless they are adequately funded, the likelihood of them performing well is 
minimal. Given the discretionary mode of integration that is being employed, financing 
demands are liable to escalate considerably as integration extends from the Single Market 
to the Single Economy and a new tier of institutions is created to support the process. 
Experience does not inspire confidence that individual national governments will either 
be disposed to or able to adequately finance emerging regional institutions, especially in 
an environment which is already politically strained and financially distressed over 
commitments to existing institutions. 
Ironically, at the sub-regional level, integration has reached a more advanced 
stage through the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), whose members 
share common institutions and a common currency; collaborate in functional areas and 
have recently formed their own Economic Union.
57
  Article 14.1 of the Revised Treaty of 
Basseterre makes provision for the pooling of national sovereignty at the supranational 
level and grants legislative authority to the OECS in five main areas – the common 
market and customs union, monetary policy, trade policy, maritime jurisdiction and civil 
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aviation.
58
 It is conceived that with time, further areas of competence can be brought 
under the purview of the sub-region rather than remain the responsibility of the individual 
national governments. The significance of these changes is that the OECS is now 
integrating at a considerably deeper level than CARICOM. Were it to widen further, 
taking in for example one of CARICOM’s larger member states, it could conceivably 
become the default institution of regional governance in the Caribbean further hastening 
the decline of CARICOM. Nonetheless, for the present, CARICOM remains the umbrella 
organization to facilitate regional integration in the Caribbean.  
In my next chapter, I propose to focus on the specific functional area of fisheries. 
I will first provide a profile of the fisheries sector, outlining its importance to the region, 
followed by an examination of why a unified fisheries policy is needed in CARICOM. 
Next, I will demonstrate, using one of the landmark cases in boundary delimitation in the 
Caribbean, that in according precedence to the individual over the collective regional 
interest, CARICOM continues to be hampered in its effort to craft this policy and by 
extension, to deepen integration among its member states. Finally, I will provide an 
update on some recent developments that have taken place in an effort to move this 
process forward. 
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                       CHAPTER 4: THE CARICOM FISHERIES SECTOR 
Profile 
   The Wider Caribbean, as defined by the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) Regional Seas Programme,
1
 comprises the territorial waters of thirty 
three bordering countries and territories. It extends from the north eastern coast of Brazil 
to Cape Hatteras off North Carolina in the United States and includes all coastal states in 
between.
2
 It comprises three large marine ecosystems – the Gulf of Mexico, the Guyana-
Brazil shelf and the Caribbean Sea. 
The Caribbean Sea is the second largest sea in the world. It is a semi-enclosed 
sea, which covers approximately 2.5 million square kilometers.
3
  Almost 90 percent of its 
circumference is separated from the open ocean either by continental or island land 
masses.  It is bounded in the north by the islands of the Greater Antilles;
4
 in the south by 
the South American Republics of Venezuela and Colombia; in the east by the Lesser 
Antilles,
5
 Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago; and in the west by the Central American 
                                                             
1 The Regional Seas Programme was launched in 1974 by UNEP as a global initiative to improve the state 
of the world’s oceans. Its primary objective is to assist member countries to address and mitigate the 
causes and consequences of environmental degradation in their territorial and coastal waters through the 
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2
 Lucia Fanning et al., “A Large Marine Ecosystem Governance Framework,” Marine Policy, 31: 4(2007): 
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Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, November-December 2010, p: 1 
4
 Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
5
 These include both the Windward and the Leeward Islands. 
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Republics of Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala as well as Belize 
and Mexico.
6
 
This body of water houses a vast and valuable array of marine resources both 
living and non living. The living resources include a variety of fish species such as reef 
fish, small and medium sized coastal pelagic
7
 species, large migratory pelagic fish, 
continental shelf demersals,
8
 deep slope snapper and groupers as well as various 
invertebrate species including crabs, spiny lobsters, shrimp, conch and mollusks. Oil and 
natural gas are the major commercially exploitable mineral resources of the Caribbean 
Sea, with the largest reserves located in the Northern and Southern parts of the region. 
The primary producers of oil and gas are Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba, and 
a large proportion of these resources are located off shore.  
The islands of the Caribbean are dependent in varying degrees upon their marine 
resources for economic and social development. The fisheries sector in particular is 
strategically important to the member states of CARICOM for several reasons. First, it 
provides employment for approximately 182,000 persons
9
 in a region where high levels 
of unemployment and underemployment continue to be of concern. In addition, it creates 
indirect opportunities for others involved in processing, boat building, marketing, net 
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making and similar support industries. In the remote coastal communities, many of those 
engaged in fishing are among the most socio-economically disadvantaged of the society, 
with low levels of formal education, limited access to capital and limited occupational 
and geographic mobility. Secondly, the fisheries sector serves as an important foreign 
currency earner for some member states of CARICOM as high value fish from the region 
such as shrimp, queen conch, tuna, deep-water snappers and groupers continue to fetch 
premium prices on the international market. Although a relatively small contributor to 
GDP, the sector brings in over US $150 million of annual revenue,
10
 to the region with 
Guyana, Suriname, Belize and the Bahamas reflecting the highest foreign exchange 
earnings. 
Table 1:  Contribution of Fisheries Sector to Annual GDP of CARICOM Members                        
Member State  Average % Contribution to GDP 
                    (2001-2006) 
Antigua & Barbuda 1.85 
Bahamas 1.5 
Barbados 1 
Belize 3.85 
Dominica 1.88 
Grenada 2.2 
Guyana 6.85 
Jamaica 0.42 
Haiti NA 
St. Kitts And Nevis 1.17 
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Available at http://acpfish2-eu.org/index.php?page=caribbean-3&hl=en  (accessed March 8, 2012). 
51 
 
St. Lucia 0.81 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.05 
Suriname 1.8 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.13 
Turks and Caicos 1.14 
           
Source: Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM) – Second Medium Term 
Plan 2008-2011, CRFM Secretariat, Belize, September 29, 2008 p.32   
 http://www.caricom-fisheries.com 
                                    
 Thirdly, the fishing industry plays a significant role in nutrition and food security 
among the region’s inhabitants since fish and other marine species provide vital sources 
of animal protein. Overall per capita consumption of fish within CARICOM averages 23-
25kg per year.
11
 Antigua and Barbuda and Guyana with 55 and 67 kg respectively have 
the highest per capita consumption, while Belize and Trinidad and Tobago at 15 kg have 
the lowest. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the industry to the region, the sector is by no 
means uniform. The fisheries economies vary considerably in terms of level of 
exploitation of marine resources; advancement of fleet structure; importance of the sector 
to each national economy and most importantly;  in terms of the approach taken by 
individual states to the development, management and conservation of the resources 
within their respective jurisdictions.  
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Why the Need for a Common Fisheries Policy? 
For the most part, the fisheries of CARICOM countries are multi-species, multi-
gear the exception of shrimp and ground fish which are harvested by foreign trawlers, the 
vast majority of fishing operations in the Caribbean are small - scale or artisanal in nature 
dominated by rudimentary open fishing vessels. Owners and operators do not adhere 
strictly to regulations such as  licensing, boat registration or gear limitations and have 
minimal knowledge regarding open and closed seasons, closed access areas, minimum 
harvest size of fishes, prohibition of inappropriate gear and other such measures designed 
to protect and conserve marine resources. 
In light of the close proximity of these states to one another, and the extension of 
maritime boundaries as permitted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), much of the fish stocks existing in the Caribbean Sea move freely from 
one jurisdiction to another and are therefore considered to be shared or straddling stocks. 
In this regard, there have been frequent incidences of illegal and unregulated fishing by 
local fishermen operating within each other’s territorial seas and Exclusive Economic 
Zones. In addition, illegal incursions by foreign vessels into the waters of CARICOM 
Member and Associated Member States continue to be a problem.  
As is the case with most global fisheries resources, the Caribbean is experiencing 
enormous challenges because of over exploitation. Over fishing and environmental 
degradation due to habitat loss threaten many of the region’s fisheries.  In 2003, the 
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Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM)
12
 reported that all major, traditional 
commercially targeted species and specie groups located in near-shore/coastal waters in 
the Caribbean were either fully developed or over exploited. Over time, this prompted 
both small scale and commercial fisher folk to turn their attention to more aggressive 
offshore fishing for larger pelagic species;
13
 adding to a list of fisher folk from, notably 
Korea, Japan and the Republic of China, who had already been exploiting the marine 
resources of these waters. Distant water fleets generally fish in the Mid-Atlantic but 
approximately 20 percent of their catch takes place within the Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ)
14
 of CARICOM member states.
15
 Fish stocks, though renewable, are not infinite 
and need to be managed on a sustainable basis if their continued contribution to the 
region is to be maintained. 
Inadequate management systems, particularly legal and regulatory, have been 
identified by CARICOM Heads as one of the primary causes of illegal, unregulated and 
unreported (IUU) fishing; over-fishing; destruction of essential habitats and ultimately, 
degradation of this highly fragile ecosystem. The capacity for effective management of 
the region’s marine resources varies quite significantly among the Member States. 
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However, while the larger more developed countries have greater institutional and human 
resource capacity, even those lack adequate enforcement mechanisms and systems for the 
assessment and surveillance of the diverse number of species within their jurisdictions. 
At the root of this problem lies the fact that as developing countries with small and fragile 
economies, CARICOM members have insufficient resources to devote to fisheries 
management bearing in mind the myriad of other more challenging social and economic 
issues they face. 
Interestingly, the preamble to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas speaks to the 
achievement of food security and to a resolve to establish conditions that would facilitate 
access by nationals to the collective resources of the region on a non discriminatory basis. 
The arrangements for the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) provide for the 
right of establishment;
16
 for the free movement of labor and for joint cooperation in the 
sustainable management of fisheries resources. However, the Treaty makes no reference 
to joint exploitation of fisheries resources which would seem to fit well within the logic 
of a single market and would tie in closely with the concept of food security and with the 
arrangements for rights of establishment and free movement of labor.  To fall short of 
agreement on a common policy which will govern both management and exploitation of 
shared marine resources in CARICOM, would certainly not be in the best interest of the 
region, given that the maritime space in most member states vastly exceeds the land 
space.
17
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However, although there has been no concrete agreement reached as regards 
exploitation of common resources, there have been some notable efforts in the region to 
develop the fisheries sector via the establishment of shared institutions, policies and 
projects. One such example is the CARICOM Fisheries Resource Assessment and 
Management Programme (CFRAMP) and a second is the effort made by the OECS to 
establish a cohesive policy for the sub-region (see details in the next section). Other 
regional fisheries programs include the Integrated Caribbean Regional Agriculture 
Development Programme,
18
 a four year project funded by the European Union (1999-
2003) and the Community Based Coastal Resources Management Programme,
19
 a seven 
year project funded by the International Development Research Center (IDRC) of Canada 
(1999-2005) 
The CFRAMP Programme 
This unit was established in 1991 with joint funding from the Government of 
Canada via its International Development Agency (CIDA) and CARICOM member 
states. The goal of the project was to enhance the institutional capacity and information 
available for fisheries management planning and policy formulation among CARICOM 
member states.  The project established a regional mechanism to promote cooperation 
and facilitate the management of shared stocks. Activities under the CFRAMP project 
included training fisheries personnel throughout the region; establishing fisheries data 
and information management and analysis systems; installing fisheries advisory and 
decision-making mechanisms and strengthening fishermen’s groups and organizations to 
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increase their capacity to participate more effectively in and benefit more meaningfully 
from Government sponsored initiatives. Between 1992- 2001, a total of 21 long-term 
scholarships were granted to fisheries staff in the region to undertake studies leading to 
B.Sc, M.Sc and PhD degrees in disciplines such as marine resource development, 
statistics, economics, computer science and aquaculture.  In addition, over 700 fisheries 
staff and fishermen were able to receive short-term training in fisheries management- 
related disciplines.
20
 The CFRAMP program ended in 2002 and in March 2003, its 
successor - the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM) - was launched.  
OECS Common Fisheries Policy and Fisheries Zone 
The members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) have also 
recorded significant progress in achieving cooperation in fisheries management for the 
sub-region. Between 1983 –1985, a number of OECS member states enacted provisions 
for harmonized fisheries legislation into their national laws
21
 and in November 1989, in 
response to a growing trend towards destructive fishing practices in the region, OECS 
Heads of Government signed the Castries Declaration. This declaration sought first, to 
establish a regime for the regulation and management of pelagic resources in the Lesser 
Antilles region that would outlaw the use of destructive and inappropriate fishing 
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methods and secondly, to take all possible measures to eradicate indiscriminate fishing 
within the EEZs of the signatory member states.
22
 
Two years later in 1991, the OECS heads signed an agreement establishing the 
OECS Common Fisheries and Surveillance Zone (CFSZ). Under this agreement, OECS 
enforcement officers from any member state were authorized to enforce the fisheries laws 
within the waters of another state signatory to the agreement. In that same year, it was 
decided that the CFSZ would be extended to a Common Fisheries Zone (CFZ) for the 
OECS sub – region. In a similar vein to the Common Fisheries Policy and Regime being 
considered at present (2012) by CARICOM, it was intended that the OECS CFZ would 
encompass the waters of all parties to the agreement, minus the territorial sea and the 
archipelagic waters. In addition, a coordination unit with responsibility for outlining the 
criteria for granting access to the CFZ by parties and non parties to the agreement was 
also proposed under the OECS CFZ agreement.  OECS Heads directed that since the 
region is comprised of four geographic zones, territories sharing the same zone should 
first establish a common zone among themselves with a view to a gradual merging of the 
zones in the entire region. Unfortunately, this mandate was never carried out and as such, 
the Common Fisheries Zone was never officially formalized. However, the OECS 
Secretariat, through its Natural Resources Management Unit completed preparation of a 
regional fisheries policy for the OECS territories in 1999. 
In light of the clearly established need, one would have thought that greater 
progress would have been made by now towards the creation of a unified regime for the 
joint management, exploitation and conservation of the collective and shared fisheries 
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resources of the region. However, as history has shown, despite a willingness to promote 
greater interdependence particularly in light of the CSME, there remain certain 
fundamental challenges to member states’ ability to unite on this issue. These difficulties, 
which will be discussed next, clearly illustrate how loyalty to national over collective 
interest continues to hinder CARICOM in its efforts. 
Boundary Delimitation 
The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1994 allowed coastal states to claim as part of their maritime jurisdictions, 
a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) stretching from the seaward or outer edge of 
the territorial sea.  UNCLOS legislation grants full sovereign rights to coastal states over 
the exploitation and use of all marine resources both living and non living located within 
their EEZs. 
As signatories to UNCLOS, all of the independent members of CARICOM have 
enacted national maritime legislation in each of their respective countries declaring their 
EEZs as allowed under international law. However, this presents a challenge in the 
ongoing effort to forge a CFPR governing the entire region, since their close proximity to 
each other prevents most states from delimiting the full extent of their EEZs without 
overlapping into an adjacent territory or territories. In cases where maritime jurisdictions 
overlap, the national legislations passed by all CARICOM members indicate that the 
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outer limit “shall be resolved by Agreement or other means recognized by International 
Law or, (in the absence of agreement), the outer limit shall be the median line.”23   
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS obligate adjacent coastal states to enter into 
bilateral delimitation negotiations and agreements for the clear and identifiable 
demarcation of boundaries. There are in excess of sixty potential maritime boundaries to 
be delimited by CARICOM states,
24
 including intra-CARICOM Agreements and 
CARICOM/extra-CARICOM Agreements. However, to date, only seven of these have 
been settled via bilateral negotiations. One provisional agreement has been reached 
between Barbados and Guyana,
25
 while the delimitation cases of Barbados v Trinidad and 
Tobago and Guyana v Suriname were only settled after the disputing parties referred the 
matters to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  With the exception of Barbados and 
Guyana, no other inter-CARICOM bilateral agreements have yet been reached through 
negotiations. Limited financial resources, technical expertise and access to accurate 
information on the status of the marine resources in the areas to be delimited, coupled 
with the high number of bilateral delimitation agreements, whether inter CARICOM or 
with third parties that each CARICOM member is required to conclude, have all 
contributed to these protracted delays. 
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Table 2: Maritime Boundary Agreements by CARICOM /Extra CARICOM States 
 
                          STATE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT TO BE   
CONCLUDED WITH:    
Antigua and Barbuda St. Kitts and Nevis; Montserrat (United 
Kingdom); Guadeloupe (France) 
Bahamas United States of America; Cuba; Haiti; 
Turks and Caicos Islands (United 
Kingdom) 
Belize Mexico; Guatemala; Cayman Islands 
(United Kingdom); Honduras 
Barbados St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Grenada; 
Venezuela; Jamaica; Trinidad and Tobago; 
St. Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia, Antigua 
and Barbuda; Martinique (France) 
Dominica Martinique; Guadeloupe (France); 
Venezuela 
Grenada St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Barbados; 
Trinidad and Tobago; Venezuela 
Guyana Trinidad and Tobago; Venezuela; Suriname 
Jamaica Cayman Islands (United Kingdom); Cuba; 
Haiti; Colombia 
Montserrat (United Kingdom) Antigua and Barbuda; St. Kitts and Nevis; 
Venezuela 
St. Kitts and Nevis Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat (United 
Kingdom); Saba (Netherlands); Venezuela 
Saint Lucia Martinique (France); St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Barbados 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago; Saint Lucia; 
Grenada; Barbados; Venezuela 
Trinidad and Tobago Barbados; Guyana; Grenada; Venezuela 
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France Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Dominica; 
saint Lucia 
United Kingdom Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Belize; 
Jamaica; St. Kitts and Nevis 
The Netherlands Saint Kitts and Nevis  
Cuba Bahamas; Jamaica 
Haiti Bahamas; Jamaica 
Colombia Jamaica 
 Venezuela Barbados; Grenada; Guyana; Montserrat 
(United Kingdom); St. Kitts and Nevis; 
Saint Lucia; St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Dominica 
Honduras Belize; Jamaica 
Suriname Guyana 
Mexico Belize 
United States Bahamas 
Dominican Republic Bahamas 
Guatemala Belize 
Nicaragua Jamaica 
Source:  Barton Scotland, “Delimitation in the Caribbean- CARICOM States 
Prospects, Problems, Prognosis,” in Intervention, Border and Maritime Issues in 
CARICOM, eds., Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang, Ian Randle Publishers, 
2007 pp:286-287 
As CARICOM countries continued to expand their maritime territories as per the 
provisions of UNCLOS without formalizing conclusive boundary delimitation 
agreements among themselves, an increasing number of fishermen began to be displaced 
from their “traditional” fishing grounds. This has led to maritime disputes between 
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CARICOM neighbors regarding claims to straddling and migratory stocks and marine 
resources found in the areas of bilateral overlap.  
An additional challenge to the establishment of the proposed fisheries policy is 
that to date, with the exception of Belize and Saint Lucia, CARICOM members have not 
ratified, and therefore are not all bound by the United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement- UNFSA). The UNFSA, adopted 
August 4 1995, is an implementing protocol of UNCLOS and is binding on all 
signatories. It outlines the mechanisms for international cooperation and the obligations 
of member states regarding the management and exploitation of straddling and migratory 
stocks within their jurisdictions.  Specifically, Article 8 of UNFSA   stipulates that 
coastal states are encouraged “to pursue cooperation in relation to straddling stocks and 
highly migratory species either directly or through appropriate sub regional or regional 
fisheries management organizations.”26   
This issue of boundary delimitation is further complicated by the fact that six 
Member States – Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago -  have satisfied the requirements for and 
have each passed the necessary individual legislation to declare themselves “archipelagic 
states”27 as defined by Article 47(1) of UNCLOS. The archipelagic status of states within 
CARICOM affects the delimitation of boundaries, since it provides for an additional zone 
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of waters (archipelagic waters) between the inland waters and the territorial sea of a 
state’s jurisdiction, over which the archipelagic state exercises complete sovereignty. In 
addition, archipelagic states that share common stock are obligated under Article 51 of 
UNCLOS to respect the traditional fishing rights of immediately neighboring states. 
The Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Dispute 
The maritime boundary delimitation dispute between Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago captured the region’s attention throughout 2004 and 2005.This was a period in 
which CARICOM was fully engaged in its thrust towards enhanced economic 
cooperation and greater integration via the establishment of the CSME. Ironically, it 
involved two of the pioneers of the original West Indies Federation and two of the most 
ardent proponents of the CSME. 
 On February 16, 2004, the Government of Barbados filed a Notice of Arbitration 
and Statement of Claim with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
28
 in accordance 
with Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS. It initiated these dispute settlement proceedings 
against the Government of Trinidad and Tobago ostensibly over the inability to finalize a 
fishing agreement regarding access to migratory flying fish resources located in waters 
off the north, northeast and northwest coasts of Tobago. This action came after more than 
ten years of bilateral negotiations had failed to produce a result. 
At the center of this dispute was the fisheries agreement. However, as the process 
developed before the arbitration panel, it became clear that there were a number of more 
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complex matters at stake including rights of access to migratory and straddling stocks; 
sovereignty of EEZs and the prospect of exercising control over potential hydrocarbon 
resources that lay under the seabed.
29
  
Consistent with the principles enshrined in UNCLOS, the Government of 
Barbados in February 1978 passed its Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act
30
 claiming 
its Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles. Eight years later in 1986, Trinidad 
and Tobago passed its own Archipelagic Waters and Exclusive Economic Zone Act,
31
 
declaring itself an archipelagic state and also claiming the full extent of its EEZ. Less 
than 200 nautical miles separated both states. Within this zone of adjacency, stocks of 
flying fish would migrate freely from the waters of Barbados into the territorial waters of 
Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, the seabed beneath this area of bilateral overlap was 
known to be rich in natural gas resources. The stage was therefore set for conflict to erupt 
between both states. 
During this period, Trinidad and Tobago’s Coast Guard began arresting, with 
increasing frequency, Barbadian fishermen found harvesting flying fish off the coast of 
Tobago, accusing them of fishing illegally in Trinidad and Tobago’s territorial waters. To 
avert further escalation of this conflict, the two countries entered into bilateral 
negotiations and successfully brokered a one-year fishing agreement in November 1990. 
This instrument outlined specific terms and conditions under which Barbadian fishermen 
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would be allowed to harvest fisheries located within Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ.32  In 
addition, the agreement authorized the Government of Barbados to import “up to 300 
metric tons of whole and processed flying fish and associated pelagic species of an 
acceptable quality from approved vendors.”33  Essentially therefore, while agreeing to 
allow measured access to its sovereign fishing grounds, the Government of Trinidad and 
Tobago was also seeking to cultivate Barbados as a market for its own fishermen. 
Approximately one month prior to the expiration of the one-year agreement, the 
Government of Barbados proposed negotiation of a new agreement. Trinidad and 
Tobago, however, offered to extend the terms and conditions of the original 1990 
agreement for an additional year which the Government of Barbados refused. According 
to the Trinidad and Tobago government, the decision to maintain the terms of the old 
instrument was in keeping with its national interests, its sovereign rights as well as its 
obligations and responsibilities to protect against over fishing and depletion of the fish 
stocks within its jurisdiction as enshrined in UNCLOS under Article 62(4). 
One of the main reasons for the collapse of bilateral negotiations between 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago was the difference in perspectives which each party 
had on the issues of disagreement. Barbados was of the view that the negotiation of a 
boundary delimitation agreement and a fisheries agreement were two intricately linked 
maritime issues.  The Government of Trinidad and Tobago on the other hand, viewed 
each as mutually exclusive.  Both positions reflected differing national interests. 
Barbados was interested in ensuring that its artisanal fisher folk continued to have access 
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to the migratory stocks in light of the importance of the fisheries industry to the country’s 
economy. On the other hand, given the fact that the electoral districts of Tobago could 
very well be decisive in determining which party governs the country, the interests or 
demands of Barbados could not be placed above those of Tobago by allowing Barbadian 
fishermen unlimited right of access to fish stocks within its EEZ. 
By elevating the matter to binding arbitration, Barbados was seeking to have the 
Tribunal establish a single maritime boundary line of demarcation to delimit the EEZ and 
continental shelf between both countries as provided for under UNCLOS Articles 73 and 
83. Barbados also argued that since its fishermen had for centuries been fishing off the 
north, northeast and northwest coasts of Tobago, it had an automatic historical right of 
access to the resources located within the territorial waters of Trinidad and Tobago. 
On April 11, 2006, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered its decision. First, it established 
a single maritime boundary between Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados in the area of 
dispute (See Figure 1). However, it failed to render a substantive judgment on the matter 
of whether Barbadian fishermen should be allowed access to the territorial waters of 
Trinidad and Tobago because it did not have the jurisdiction to do so. The PCA 
concluded that both parties were: 
“…under a duty to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure 
the conservation and development of flying fish stocks, and to negotiate in good 
faith and conclude an agreement that will accord fisher folk of Barbados access to  
fisheries within the exclusive economic Zone of Trinidad and Tobago, subject to 
the limitations and conditions of that agreement and to the right and duty of 
Trinidad and Tobago to conserve and manage the living resources of waters  
67 
 
            within its jurisdiction.
34
   
UNCLOS legislation invests a coastal state with exclusive sovereignty over the 
resources within its EEZ. Therefore by denying Barbadian fishermen automatic access to 
migratory flying fish off the coast of Tobago, Trinidad and Tobago was acting to protect 
the marine resources in the area of its jurisdiction. Despite Barbados’s claim to “historic” 
and “traditional’ rights and privileges, the PCA determined that bilateral negotiations 
between the disputants were the only means by which the fishing dispute could be 
resolved since Barbados had failed to prove that it did in fact have such inherent rights.  
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Figure 1: Source: Sovereign Geographic Inc.   
http://www.sovereigngeographic.com/maritime_pdf/2006-barb-t-and-t.pdf 
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Third Party Access 
 
Another factor hindering unity on the fisheries agreement is the absence of 
harmonized regulations governing right of access by third parties.  
Growing international concern regarding the status of stocks of tuna and other 
large pelagic species within the Atlantic and other oceans have prompted fisheries 
management bodies such as the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) to impose strict regulations in order to prevent over-fishing on 
these prized resources. To avoid the burden of higher registration fees, taxes and more 
stringent safety standards, some international vessel operators have opted to register as 
Flags of Convenience (FOC)
35
 vessels in countries that are classified as open registries. 
Visions of boosting historical catch statistics and possibly guaranteeing future 
quota allocations as well as the prospects for training and employment for fisher folk 
have prompted some CARICOM member states to strike joint venture deals with these 
FOC vessels. These opportunities appear most attractive to countries in need of tangible 
solutions to resolve problems pertaining to food security and economic development. In 
some cases, for example, FOC vessels are allowed to use ports in the region as facilities 
for transshipment and taking of supplies to conduct deep sea fishing on the high seas. In 
return for the right of access, they may establish small processing plants that employ 
locals, successfully winning governments’ support. The problem lies in the fact that 
without adequate and fully operational Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) 
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systems in place in CARICOM countries, as FOC vessels traverse national waters to use 
ports in the region, they illegally harvest essential fish resources on which local artisanal 
fisher folk may be solely dependent for their livelihood. Due to the economic benefits to 
be gained however, there is a low level of interest among member states that license FOC 
vessels in establishing a common set of standards governing right of access to third party 
vessels or in deregistering them if they are found fishing illegally. 
These arrangements have had disastrous consequences for Belize and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines,
36
 both of which were subjected to international tuna trade sanctions 
by ICCAT because of the high incidences of IUU fishing activities carried out in their 
waters by foreign “high seas” vessels flying their flags. 
Power of the Implementing Agency 
Although not a source of intra-CARICOM disagreement, member states’ 
reservation regarding the power to be granted to the implementing agency is also a reason 
why progress on the policy has been retarded. 
The agreement under which the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism was 
established in 2002 empowers the organization to function as a Regional Fisheries 
Management Organization (RFMO). In addition, one of its primary functions is to 
promote the efficient management, conservation and sustainable development of the 
aquatic resources of the Caribbean. However, for the past ten years, it has not been 
discharging this mandate. 
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CARICOM leaders remain concerned over the fact that while the CRFM may not 
now have the power to make decisions that are directly binding on them, if allowed to 
function as a managerial entity, its Ministerial Council will be able to make conservation 
and management recommendations that member states will be obligated to implement. 
Therefore, the Heads have resisted this and have instead opted to use it as an advisory 
body providing scientific information and performing a supportive role.  As the 
commercially important fish stocks and the coastal and marine ecosystems continue to 
decline and as pressure increases internally for greater food security, the need for more 
responsible management is urgent. Whether or not the CRFM will be vested with the 
necessary authority to perform in a managerial capacity is as much a matter of political 
will as it is an indication of the importance they place on sustainable development of the 
fisheries sector.  
The Common Fisheries Policy and Regime (CFPR) 
At their fourteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting held in Trinidad and Tobago on 14-15 
February 2003, CARICOM Heads of Government accepted a proposal by the 
Government of Barbados for the creation of a Common Fisheries Policy and Regime 
(CFPR) for the region. It was envisaged that such a regime would further extend the 
existing rights and privileges accorded to member states under the provisions of the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) to include a unified approach to the 
economic management of their fishery sectors. Specifically, it was intended that under 
the CFPR, provision would be made for the creation of a Common Fisheries Zone (CFZ), 
encompassing the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of individual member states, in 
which they would be allowed equal access to the harvest of surplus and straddling fish 
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stocks. It was also proposed that an autonomous regional organization be established for 
the purpose of administering, implementing and enforcing the policy. While member 
states accepted the idea of a CFPR in principle, many were cautious about the 
establishment of a CFZ since they believed that to do so would mean relinquishing 
portions of their EEZs and by extension, their sovereignty to a regional authority.  
The overarching goal of the CFPR is to establish a common fisheries policy and 
regime within the context of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, for the conservation, 
management, sustainable use and development of living aquatic resources and related 
ecosystems and the promotion of competitive trade for the social and economic benefits 
of the people of the participating states.”37 To this end, the proposed policy outlines 
several objectives which include inter alia, to improve employment opportunities; 
alleviate poverty and contribute to food security among member States; to make the 
fisheries sector more market oriented and environmentally sustainable; to establish 
uniform measures and operating procedures for  management and administration of the 
fisheries industry consistent with the provisions of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas; 
to promote and conduct research in order to facilitate decision making regarding 
sustainable use, management  and conservation of the region’s living aquatic resources; 
to provide assistance to member states on the delimitation of boundaries and to establish 
efficient monitoring and surveillance systems to ensure long term protection of the 
region’s ecosystem.38 Its scope includes all living marine resources within the CFZ, 
                                                             
37
 Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism. Draft Agreement Establishing the Common Fisheries Policy 
and Regime. Second special meeting of the Caribbean Fisheries Forum, 2 – 4 October, 2007. Article 2.2 
38
 Ibid. Article 2.1 
73 
 
which is an area of overlapping EEZs, and refers to the waters under member states’ 
jurisdiction which lie beyond the limits of the territorial sea.
39
 
The CFZ, as proposed by the working group charged by the Secretariat to produce 
the framework for this policy, will consist of two large non contiguous sub-regions – 
from Jamaica to the Bahamas in the North and from Saint Lucia to Suriname in the 
South, with a series of smaller sub-areas including Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda and Belize.
40
  
To appease national interests, it is intended that member states will retain absolute 
authority over the management of the fisheries resources found up to the boundary of 
their territorial seas. In addition, they will have the power to determine the status of their 
stocks and the prerogative to issue licenses to third parties to allow them access to fish in 
this area. However, within the designated CFZ, member states must first be authorized by 
the regional authority in order to gain access to harvest these resources. This provision 
continues to be a major source of contention among CARICOM Heads of Government 
since it would involve not only ceding their autonomy to an external entity but 
relinquishing control over their EEZs. The latter is particularly significant in cases where 
straddling and migratory stocks reside in the areas of overlap. 
In most CARICOM countries, the institutional structure of the fisheries sector is 
arranged linearly.
41
 The State plays the central role in all aspects of fisheries 
management, regulation and conservation. It does so through direct intervention and 
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implementation of relevant policies and development programs. Fisheries departments 
are generally located under the wider umbrella of a Ministry of Agriculture or Natural 
Resources with varying and often tangential levels of involvement from other 
government agencies, research institutions and from the stakeholders in the industry 
itself.  
Under the proposed arrangement, the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism 
(CRFM) will be the designated regional entity charged with the administration and 
management of the CFPR. Its major responsibilities include establishing cooperative 
arrangements among member states for the management of shared, straddling or 
migratory species; determining access rights to resources in the CFZ; deciding on catch 
and fishing limits where over capacity is deemed to exist and adopting the necessary 
conservation measures for the management of resources under its jurisdiction. 
Recent Developments 
At a Multi-Disciplinary workshop convened by the Caribbean Regional Fisheries 
Mechanism in Georgetown, Guyana on April 12 – 14, 2011, stake holders finally agreed 
on the text of the Draft Agreement on the Establishment of a CARICOM Common 
Fisheries Policy. The policy document has since been referred to and approved by the 
CARICOM Ministers with responsibility for fisheries (the CRFM Ministerial Council), 
but has not yet received the endorsement of the Caribbean Heads of Government. 
There are some notable differences between this agreement and the earlier version 
which was being proposed. These differences once again reflect the governments’ 
prioritization of individual sovereignty. Firstly, Article 5(f) which outlines the 
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fundamental principles by which the agreement will be guided refers to a principle of 
subsidiarity and states that: the [Implementing Agency] will only perform those tasks 
which cannot be more effectively achieved by [the] individual Participating Parties.”42 
This clearly reduces the degree of autonomy initially proposed for the implementing 
agency, rendering it subordinate to the authority of the national fisheries institutions and 
by extension, to the will of the individual member states and their Heads of Government. 
The revised language further stipulates that the agency will inter alia concentrate 
on providing technical assistance and advice to member states on policy issues; 
coordinating data collection and research activities; supporting member states in their 
interactions and relations with Third Parties; identifying and mobilizing technical and 
financial resources to help build member states research capabilities and representing 
CARICOM at various international forums. While these are important services to 
regional and national needs, the agency charged with the responsibility of administering a 
common regional policy has still not been vested with the authority to perform a 
managerial rather than simply an advisory role. 
Secondly, regarding access to fisheries resources, Article 9 of the recently 
approved policy states that a Member State may consider entering into an arrangement 
either with another member state or with a Third Party for the purpose of providing them 
access to fishing opportunities in its waters.  As previously discussed, one of the major 
sources of contention in maritime relations within CARICOM is the lack of standardized 
regulations governing both the exploitation of shared stocks in areas of overlap and the 
                                                             
42
 Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Community Common 
Fisheries Policy. Aticle 5(f). April 14, 2011. Georgetown, Guyana 
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grant of access rights to foreign distant water vessels (Third Parties). Therefore, the 
development of an appropriate licensing system which would include the agreement to 
comply with the regulations of the CFZ is an essential requirement for the management 
and control of exploitation. If the authority to license fishing vessels is left solely to 
member states, it will neither be possible to accurately assess the extent of harvesting in 
relation to quantity of available stock, nor to exercise control over fishing activities to 
prevent over exploitation and long term depletion of the region’s marine resources. 
Finally, Article 20.1 provides for the development and adoption of a list of 
additional protocols to activate the broad mandates of the CFPR. Interestingly, this article 
contains the only mention made of a Common Fisheries Zone (CFZ) where it is listed as 
item (e). This again points to the reluctance of member states to elaborate on this issue. 
Member states still maintain strong reservations about its establishment, its delimitation, 
and in particular, about ceding individual sovereignty over and sharing access to the 
living resources in their EEZs.  
In the final chapter, I will re-assess my hypothesis and comment on future 
prospects for regional integration in CARICOM. 
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                  CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I have sought to provide evidence to support the hypothesis that: 
Successful integration cannot be achieved so long as Member States of a regional 
grouping are unwilling to subordinate the individual interest to the collective 
interest. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) comprises fifteen small states which 
do have a clear interest in promoting trade and development through regional integration. 
Indeed, slowly they have moved from a free trade area to the establishment of a single 
market. In the process, they have boosted functional cooperation in key areas. 
CARICOM’s leaders clearly recognize that the repositioning of the global economy has 
thrust a myriad of complex challenges on the region, making deeper integration essential 
to its future economic viability. 
However, notwithstanding the commitment in principle to work more 
collaboratively, the political leadership of CARICOM remains unwilling to countenance 
the sharing of national sovereignty. As I have demonstrated, this persistent individualism 
has guided the decisions and informed the actions of member states throughout the 
various phases of integration and has affected the process in two very significant ways. 
First, it has led to the formation of institutions which lack supra-national powers and as 
such, intergovernmental cooperation remains discretionary. Secondly, it has contributed 
to a state of inertia in the region whereby the implementation of key decisions and 
policies is extensively delayed. 
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For the past nine years, CARICOM leaders have persisted in their efforts to 
integrate the region’s fisheries sectors by forging a Common Fisheries Policy and Regime 
(CFPR) in order to maximize the sustainable use of its marine resources. Considering the 
length of time that this has engaged their attention, one would have expected that more 
substantial progress would have been made by now. However, in my examination of the 
process, I have found that they are beset by various challenges which have delayed unity 
on this issue. 
National interest has prompted member states to claim full delimitation of their 
individual Exclusive Economic Zones as permitted under international legislation. This 
has created a number of marine areas of bilateral overlap leading to disagreement over 
access to the migratory and straddling stocks that reside in these areas. In addition, there 
is concern over the displacement of fisher folk that have traditionally harvested these 
resources. Moreover, states continue to express strong reservation over the establishment 
of a Common Fisheries Zone encompassing portions of individual member states’ EEZs 
in which all will enjoy equal fishing access. Again, CARICOM states differ, primarily for 
economic reasons, in their respective policies regarding the licensing of third party 
vessels and since there is no urgency to harmonize legislation in this regard, illegal 
fishing proceeds unabated.  
In order to satisfy these competing national interests and still reach agreement on 
the fisheries policy, the Community opted, in April 2011, to alter certain key aspects of 
the CFPR which were previously envisaged. Specifically, the level of authority of the 
implementing agency has been considerably curtailed and decisions relating to right of 
access and management of individual resources will remain within the remit of the 
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member states. Given CARICOM’s stated desire to develop a common policy for the 
sustainable management of its marine resources, one would expect that a regional entity 
would be given adequate powers to address the formulation of rules and regulations for 
the overall operation of the Common Fisheries Zone (CFZ), with national fisheries units 
as the facilitating agencies in the various local jurisdictions, acting in tandem with the 
regulatory body. This decision to incorporate a decentralized management structure with 
a regional strategy is exactly indicative of the dilemma that CARICOM is grappling with 
and which continues to impede progress towards deeper integration. 
In addition, the establishment of the Common Fisheries Zone and the extent of its 
delimitation have been left to the discretion of the region’s leadership. By agreeing to the 
establishment of the common zone, member states would have benefitted immeasurably 
by inter alia, automatically gaining guaranteed access to a wider pool of resources subject 
to the conservation and management measures stipulated as part of the CFPR; having 
increased opportunities to participate in the development of fisheries in the region; 
earning supplemental revenues from the operations of Third States’ fleets in the region 
and improving the balance of trade in fisheries products in the region by import 
substitution. However, notwithstanding these benefits and the fact that the CFZ is 
consistent with the spirit and intent of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, CARICOM’s 
leaders regard the commitment to rules governing a CFZ as too big a price to pay 
individually for regional cooperation. Therefore, while there has been a measure of 
progress in that a common regional fisheries agreement has been reached, this instrument 
provides for collaboration only at a minimal level.  
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In light of the foregoing, the prospects for deeper integration in the fisheries 
sector do not appear to be particularly bright, given CARICOM’s attachment to this state-
centric concept of national sovereignty. As in other areas of functional cooperation, it is 
expected that the leadership will continue to seek the most comfortable way to pool their 
collective resources, for example by collaborating on areas such as training; ecosystem 
research; harmonization of quality assurance legislation; strengthening human resource, 
technological and institutional capacities; and transfer of technology.  It is unclear 
whether member states will eventually agree to create a common fisheries zone and if so, 
what its demarcation would be and what would be the specific protocols governing the 
exploitation of its resources. One can only hope, in the interest of those that this policy 
was designed to serve, that such a decision would not require several additional years of 
deliberation. 
The difficulties that hinder cooperation in the fisheries sector are indicative of a 
more systemic problem in the region. The leadership has agreed that even as the 
Caribbean seeks to deepen integration, CARICOM should remain a community of 
independent sovereign states without a supra-national authority to make decisions 
binding on its members. Within this framework, deeper integration requires the passage 
of national legislation to give force to regional decisions. However, given the adversarial 
nature of Caribbean politics, collective decisions can easily become hostage to domestic 
national interest. For as long as CARICOM continues to function as an amalgam of 
separate states, there will be tension between the need for more comprehensive 
integration and the political, legal and institutional mechanisms designed to underpin the 
integration process. 
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However, CARICOM is by no means the only regional grouping that is 
encountering challenges in its effort to balance individualism with collective interest.  
The European Union, for example, which has for decades been at the forefront of 
regional integration experiences and stands as the most successful example of an 
integrated regional grouping took almost four decades to initiate dialogue regarding the 
establishment of a single market. Today, that region is experiencing considerable turmoil 
among its member states in the face of a global financial crisis. There is simply no easy 
or single best way to integrate sovereign nation states with competing national postures, 
cultures and interests within a regional framework. It is a continuously evolving process 
which requires as much creativity and sacrifice as it does political will.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
82 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Axline, W.Andrew. "Integration and Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The 
Politics of Regional Negotiations." International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 
953-973. 
 
Axline, W.Andrew. "Regional Cooperation and National Security: External Forces in 
Caribbean Integration." Journal of Common Market Studies 28, no. 1 (1988): 1-
23. 
Bishop, Matthew, and Anthony Payne. “Caribbean Regional Governance and the 
Sovereignty/Statehood Problem.” The Caribbean Papers, no. 8 (2010): 3-22. 
 Accessed November 2, 2011.http://www.cigionline.org 
 
Bourne, Compton, and Marlene Attzs. "Institutions in Caribbean Economic Growth and 
Development." Social and Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (2005): 26-49. 
 
Bravo, Karen. "CARICOM: The Myth of Sovereignty and Aspirational Economic 
Integration." North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 31, no. 1 (2005): 145-205. 
 
Brewster, Havelock. "Review of the Rose Hall Declaration Provisions on Regional       
Governance." The Integrationist 1, no. 2 (2003): 12 - 28. 
 
 CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community: An Introduction. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle 
Publishers, 2005. 
 
Chakalall, Bisessar and Kevern Cochrane. “Issues in the Management of Large Pelagic 
Fisheries in CARICOM Countries.”In Management of Large Pelagic Fisheries in 
CARICOM Countries, FAO Technical Paper No.464 edited by Robin Mahon and 
Patrick Mc Conney, 1-4. Rome: FAO, 2004. 
 
Chakalall, Bisessar, Robin Mahon, and Patrick Mc Conney. "Current Issues in Fisheries 
Governance in CARICOM." Marine Policy 22, no. 1 (1998): 29-44. 
 
 
Chipman, John. "Third World Politics and Security in the 1990s: The World Forgetting 
by the World Forgot?" The Washington Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1991): 151-168. 
 
Clapham, Christopher. Third World Politics: An Introduction... London: Routledge, 
1985. 
 
Cruickshank, Jennifer, Peter A. Murray, Terrance Phillips, Susan Singh-Renton and 
Leslie Straker. “Implementing Mechanism for the Common Fisheries Policy and 
Regime.” Paper presented at the meeting of the CFP Working Group, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, November 29-30, 2004. 
83 
 
 
Dundas, Carl and Carlyle Mitchell. “A Common Fisheries Regime for the Caribbean 
Sea.” Policy paper prepared for the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism 
Secretariat, Belize City, Belize, July 2004. 
 
Fanning, Lucia. "A Large Marine Ecosystem Governance Framework." Marne Policy 31, 
no. 4 (2007): 434-443. 
 
Fawcett, Louise L, and Andrew Hurrell. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organization and International Order. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995. 
 
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. 
 
Girvan, Norman. "Whither CSME?" Journal of Caribbean International Relations 1, 
April (2005): 13-32. 
 
Girvan, Norman. “Towards a Single Development Vision and the Role of the Single 
Economy.” Report presented at the 28th Annual Meeting of the Heads of 
Government of the Caribbean Community, Needham’s Point, Barbados, July 1-4, 
2007. 
 
Grant, Cedric. "An Experiment in Supranational Governance: The Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Machinery." In Contending With Destiny: The Caribbean in the 
Twenty First Century, edited by Kenneth hall and Dennis Bann, 447-499. 
Kingston: Ian Randle, 2000.  
 
Grenade, Wendy. “An Overview of Regional Governance Arrangements in the Caribbean 
Community.” The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 5, no.12 (2005): 
1-16. 
 
Grenade, Wendy. “Exploring the Emerging CARICOM Model: Any Resemblance to the 
EU?” The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 6, no.9 (2006): 1-17. 
 
Grieco, Joseph. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 
485-507. 
 
Griffin, Clifford. "Friends versus Interests: Strategic Rationality in the Barbados-Trinidad 
and Tobago Maritime Dispute." In Intervention, Border and Maritime Issues in 
CARICOM, edited by Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck –A-Sang, 184-202. 
Kingston: Ian Randle, 2007. 
 
 
84 
 
Griffin, Clifford. "CARICOM: Confronting the Challenges of Mediation and Conflict 
Resolution." Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 45, no. 3 (2007): 303-
322. 
 
Griffin, Clifford E.. The Race for Fisheries and Hydrocarbons in the Caribbean Basin: 
the Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago Dispute, Regional Delimitation Implications. 
Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2007. 
 
Haas, Ernst B.. The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-
1957.. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958. 
 
 
Hall, Kenneth O. Integrate or Perish: Perspectives of the Heads of Government of the 
Caribbean Community and Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 1963-2002. 
2nd ed. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003. 
 
Hall, Kenneth . “CARICOM: Current Status and Future Prospects.” In Survival and 
Sovereignty in The Caribbean Community -The Integrationist, edited by Kenneth 
hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang, 140-147, Kingston: Ian Randle, 2006. 
 
Haughton, Milton. “Fisheries Subsidy and the Role of Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations: The Caribbean Experience.” Paper presented at the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Workshop on Fisheries Subsidies 
and Sustainable Fisheries Management, Geneva, Switzerland, April 26-27, 2004. 
 
Haughton, Milton. “The CFRAMP Project: A Decade of Contribution to Sustainable 
Development and management of Fisheries in the Caribbean.” Paper presented at 
the 55
th
 Annual Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute Meeting in Xel Ha, 
Mexico, November 11-15, 2002. 
 
Hoffman, Stanley . "The European Process at Atlantic Cross Purposes." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 3 (1964): 85-101. 
 
Hoffman, Stanley. "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of 
Western Europe." Daedalus 95 (1966): 862-915. 
 
Hornbeck, J.F. “CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic 
Integration.” Congressional Research Service Report RL 34308, 1-26. 
Washington: Library of Congress,2008 
 
Hurrell, Andrew. "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective." In  Regional Organization 
and International Order, edited by Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, 37-74. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
 
 
85 
 
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. 
 
Keohane, Robert O.. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
 
Kishore, Rosemarie. "Political Organization and the Socioeconomics of Fishing 
Communities in Trinidad and Tobago, Belize and Grenada." In Coastal 
Resources Management in the Wider Caribbean: Resilience, Adaptation and 
Community Diversity, edited by Yvan Breton et al, 191-222. Kingston: Ian 
Randle, 2006.  
 
Lamb, Ralna. “Assessing the Implications of Implementing a Plan to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate IUU Fishing in Belize.” Center for Resource Management and 
Environmental Studies (CERMES) Technical Report No.44, 1-68. 
 Barbados: UWI Cave Hill, 2011 
 
Legro, Jeffrey. Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
 
Lewis, Vaughn . "The Eastern Caribbean States: Fledgling Sovereignties in the Global 
Environment." In Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic and Social 
Perspectives, edited by J.I. Dominguez, R.A. Pastor and R.D.Worrell, 99-122. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1993.  
 
Lindberg, Leon N.. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963. 
 
Lindberg, Leon N., and Stuart A. Scheingold. Europe's Would-be Polity; Patterns of 
Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1970. 
 
Mahon, Robin.”Harvest Sector.” In Management of Large Pelagic Fisheries in 
CARICOM Countries, FAO Technical Paper No.464 edited by Robin Mahon and 
Patrick Mc Conney, 45-78. Rome: FAO, 2004. 
 
Manley, Michael . "Overcoming Insularity in Jamaica." Foreign Affairs 49, no. 1 (1970): 
100-110. 
 
Manning, Patrick. "Compromise and Conciliation: The Way Forward." Caribbean Affairs 
5, no. 4 (1992): 62. 
 
Mattli, Walter . The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
86 
 
Mearsheimer, John. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International 
Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5-49. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach." Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no.4 
(1993): 473-524. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew, and Frank Schimmelfennig. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism." In 
European Integration Theory, edited by A. Wiener and Thomas Diez, 67-87. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
 
Nelson, Dolliver. "The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in the Caribbean." In 
Intervention, Border and Maritime Issues in CARICOM, edited by Kenneth Hall 
and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang. 203-250.Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2007. 
 
O’Brien, Derek. “CARICOM:A Novel Approach to Regional Integration.” Paper 
presented at the VIII World Congress of The International Association of 
Constitutional Law in Mexico City, Mexico, December 6-10, 2010. 
 
O'Brien, Derek. "CARICOM: Regional Integration in a Post-Colonial World." European 
Law Journal 17, no. 5 (2011): 561-723. 
 
Payne, Anthony. "Britain and the Caribbean." In Europe and the Caribbean, edited by  
Paul Sutton, 13-36. London: MacMillan Caribbean, 1991. 
 
Payne, Anthony and Paul Sutton. “Repositioning the Caribbean within Globalization.” 
The Caribbean Papers, no.1(2007):1-29. 
 Accessed December 10, 2011.http://www.cigionline.org 
 
Pollard, D. E. The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments. Kingston [Jamaica: Caribbean 
Law Pub. Co., 2003. 
 
Pollard, Duke E. The CARICOM system. Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean Law Publishing 
Company, 2003. 
 
Puchala, Donald. "Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A 
Review Article." Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 317-331. 
 
Pulwarty, Roger , Leonard  Nurse, and Ulric Trotz. "Caribbean Islands in a Changing 
Climate." Environment :Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Nov. - 
Dec. 2010. 
 
Putnam, Robert . "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." 
International Organization 42 (1988): 427-460. 
 
87 
 
Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 
 
Scotland, Barton. "Delimitation in the Caribbean: CARICOM States' Prospects, Problems 
and Prognosis." In Intervention, Border and Maritime Issues in CARICOM, 
edited by Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang, 277-290. Kingston: Ian 
Randle, 2007.  
 
Swann, Dennis. The Economics of Europe: From Common Market to European Union. 
9th ed. London: Penguin, 2000. 
 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Development 
Report, 1-192. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981 
 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration.  Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of An 
Arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Accessed May 5, 2012. 
              http://www.pca-cpa.org 
 
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including 
The Caribbean Single market and Economy. Accessed May 5, 2012. 
 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf 
 
The Revised Treaty of Basseterre Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States Economic Union. Accessed May 5, 2012. 
 http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/pdf/oecs_economic_union_treaty.pdf 
 
The Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the 
Caribbean Common Market. Accessed May 5, 2012 
 http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/original_treaty.jsp?menu=community 
 
Thorndike, Anthony. "Revolution, Democracy and Regional Integration in the Eastern 
Caribbean." In Modern Caribbean Politics, edited by Anthony Payne and Paul 
Sutton, 147-175. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1993.  
 
Time for Action: Report of the West Indian Commission. Kingston: UWI Press, 1993. 
 
Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1950. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
 
Wendt, Alexander . "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics." International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
88 
 
 
Wickham, P.W.. "Factors in the Integration and Disintegration of the Caribbean." In 
Issues in the Government and Politics of the West Indies: A Reader, edited by 
John La Guerre , 225-273. St. Augustine: University of the West Indies, 1997. 
 
 
Wint, Alvin . "The Economic Impact of Caribbean Regional Integration: National Policy 
and Intra Regional Performance Differences." In Caribbean Imperatives: 
Regional Governance and Integrated Development, edited by Kenneth Hall and 
Dennis Benn, 137-139. Kingston: Ian Randle, 2005. 
 
. 
